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INTRODUCTION 
Intellectual property is today thought to be principally of 
statutory origin. Discussions of the subject invariably revolve around a 
close scrutiny of the federal statutes involved. Indeed, the frequency 
with which Congress amends the patent and copyright statutes seems 
to leave little doubt that it alone determines intellectual property’s 
precise content and coverage.1 Nevertheless, there exists a rather 
robust body of state law that is almost entirely the creation of state 
courts and is directed at creating entitlements in information, ideas, 
expression, goodwill, one’s image, and other related intangibles. These 
rights regimes are in turn collectively referred to as “common law 
intellectual property.”2 Examples include the right of publicity, unfair 
 
 1. As of 2004, Congress had amended the Copyright Act of 1976 about forty-eight times. 
See 17 U.S.C.A. et seq. (West 2010); David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly, 51 
UCLA L. REV. 1233, 1299–315 (2004) (listing and evaluating these various amendments). 
The Patent Act of 1952 has similarly been amended thirty-nine times since its enactment. See 35 
U.S.C.A. et seq. (West 2010).  
 2. Use of this phrase to describe this set of rights is somewhat uncommon among scholars. 
For the earliest use of the term see Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the 
Legacy of International News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411, 411 (1983); see 
also Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary 
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competition, common law copyright, trade secrets, misappropriation, 
common law idea protection, and passing off.  
While each of these regimes covers a distinct intangible, they 
all share the same structural characteristics.3 Each originates in a 
cause of action that is grounded in tort, contract, or unjust enrichment 
and is tailored to the circumstances under which protection is deemed 
necessary. Unlike the one-size-fits-all federal copyright and patent 
statutes, these regimes allow courts to adopt a far more nuanced 
approach to intellectual property protection. Instead of relying on a 
single overarching theory to justify protection, courts look to the 
practical needs of a particular area, recognize multiple values as 
relevant for consideration there, and then adopt a highly contextual 
approach to protection, one best described as “antifoundational.” 
Additionally, the common law method that they employ develops the 
law incrementally, recognizing the need for caution in a rapidly 
changing social and technological environment, and allowing future 
courts to extend, limit, or at times altogether deny protection when 
circumstance and context change. I call this method of adjudication 
and rule development “pragmatic incrementalism,” in that it exhibits 
the characteristics of both legal pragmatism and common law 
incrementalism. 
Several of these common law regimes are almost as old as their 
statutory counterparts, if not older.4 Yet, for decades now, many have 
voiced their skepticism about the usefulness of these rights, especially 
in light of congressional activity in the area.5 Justice Louis Brandeis 
 
Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 150–52 (1992) (discussing the shift towards state court creation of 
common law intellectual property rights); Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse on Public 
Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783, 796 (2006) (describing the “right of publicity” as a common law 
intellectual property right); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Is There a Right to Have Something to 
Say? One View of the Public Domain, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 297, 322 n.106 (2004) (asserting that 
courts rarely find common law intellectual property rights to be preempted unless a conflict 
exists between the right and statutory copyright interests). Interestingly, a Westlaw search 
revealed that no more than five courts have ever used the phrase, independent of citing to 
Baird’s article.  
 3. This by no means implies that these regimes do not bleed into each other, for they very 
often do. See Paul Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory 
Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1113–18 (1977) (noting the 
connections between common law copyright, misappropriation, privacy rights, and the law of 
ideas). 
 4. Common law copyright, for instance, dates back to the period surrounding the passage 
of the first copyright law, the Statute of Anne. Shortly after the Statute, courts came to recognize 
the existence of copyright at common law, independent of the Statute, and unfettered by any 
restrictions (temporal or otherwise) imposed on copyright by the Statute. See, e.g., Millar v. 
Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.) 217–19, 225–29; see also infra Section I.B (discussing the 
common law evolution of publicity rights that were later recognized by state statutes).  
 5. See Baird, supra note 2, at 411 (examining this skepticism). 
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and Judge Learned Hand, both outspoken champions of the common 
law in other contexts, were well-known skeptics of common law 
intellectual property.6 They feared that allowing courts to create and 
develop intellectual property rights would result in the overprotection 
of information, thereby impeding free speech and allied interests. 
More recently, Douglas Baird has argued that, while common law 
intellectual property has done little to impede the free flow of 
information, its deep flaw nonetheless lies in having courts choose 
among competing analogies to develop the law.7 Since each analogy 
emphasizes a different value, Baird argues that courts are hard-
pressed to choose effectively among them. 
On closer examination, however, these objections are myopic. 
In focusing entirely on the issue of judicial competence, they disregard 
the structural and substantive advantages that accompany common 
law rulemaking in intellectual property, all of which are borne out by 
the continuing vitality of these regimes. The method of pragmatic 
incrementalism that courts have come to employ emphasizes a 
cautionary, context-sensitive approach to intellectual property 
development. The extensive situational tailoring and modification that 
this incrementalism brings about adequately safeguards the process 
against the possibility of overprotection. Besides, recent developments 
in the federal arena have also cast serious doubt on claims of 
legislatures’ superior competence in intellectual property lawmaking. 
In particular, the federal copyright and patent systems are in a state 
of crisis. Congress has repeatedly extended the term and coverage of 
copyright protection, often bereft of any reason other than pure 
industry rent seeking, prompting calls for radical reform.8 So too, the 
 
 6. Justice Brandeis’s objections are best seen in his dissenting opinion in the Supreme 
Court case of International News Service v. Associated Press, dealing with common law 
misappropriation, where he notes how courts are “ill-equipped” to undertake this task and that 
“resort to legislation” was preferable whenever the competing interests were extremely complex. 
248 U.S. 215, 263, 267 (1918). For Judge Hand’s criticisms of common law intellectual property, 
see Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records, Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 667 (2d Cir. 1955) (Hand, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s creation of common law interests is too expansive and 
defeats the purpose of uniformity); Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 
1929) (observing how the creation of common law interests “would flagrantly conflict with the 
scheme which Congress has for more than a century devised to cover the subject-matter”). 
 7. Baird, supra note 2, at 428–29. 
 8. See JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 49–51 (2008) (arguing that the movement 
towards extending copyright protections proceeded “with little argument and less evidence” and 
pointing out that the trend is “a vote of no confidence in the productive powers of the commons” ); 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 
250–51 (2001) (explaining that copyright law has increased in scope to automatically protect 
ideas for the life of the author plus seventy five years and advocating for shorter copyright 
protections where the author must publish and renew a copyright to prevent it from becoming 
publicly available); NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 54–56 (tracing the 
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patent system seems to be stifling rather than stimulating innovation 
in a variety of different areas.9 Unsurprisingly, scholars have begun 
calling for fundamental changes to the patent system as well.10 
Despite all of this, reform efforts have met with little success as a 
consequence of the interest group gridlock that is endemic to most 
congressional efforts. Few, if any, have turned to courts and the 
common law for solutions in recent times.11 
Baird’s concern that courts are hard-pressed to choose between 
different analogies also underappreciates the significance of 
antifoundational decisionmaking, a core feature of pragmatic 
incrementalism. Rather than relying on a single foundational theory 
for the regime, the process requires courts to balance several 
competing values as they relate to a particular context. In other 
words, the very selection of an “appropriate” analogy from among 
several options forces courts to confront and recognize as legitimate a 
multiplicity of goals and interests for the institution12—a strong virtue 
of analogical reasoning in the law.13  
What exactly is intellectual property law trying to achieve? For 
decades now, courts, scholars, and legislators have struggled to 
articulate a coherent theory of intellectual property.14 These 
 
historical expansion of copyright and arguing that some aspects of the expansion are 
troublesome and exceed the scope of what is necessary to promote creativity) (2008). 
 9. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 10–16 (2008) (suggesting that many 
industries would be better off without a patent system because, although for each individual the 
private benefits of a patent exceeds the cost of obtaining it, the collective costs that a patent 
imposes on other innovators outweighs the marginal incentive to innovate that patent protection 
spurs); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE 
IT 30–31(2009) (explaining that the current patent system “may do more harm than good to 
innovation, because the assertion and litigation of too many bad patents against companies that 
make innovative products ends up rising their costs and reducing their innovation more than the 
existence of those patents spurs new innovation”). 
 10. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 9, at 27; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 9, at 37. 
 11. A notable exception to this is the recent work by Dan Burk and Mark Lemley, who 
advocate a common law approach to patent reform. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 9, at 104.  
 12. Baird, supra note 2, at 428–29. 
 13. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 41 (1996) (observing 
how analogical reasoning allows courts to decide cases without reference to abstract theory, 
thereby allowing multiple values and conflicting interests to coexist in the law as a whole); Cass 
R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 743 (1993) (“[A]nalogical 
reasoning has important advantages over general theories, because those who use analogies are 
especially attuned to the diverse and plural goods that are at stake in legal and ethical 
decisions.”); see also Emily Sherwin, A Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1179, 1196–97 (1999) (pointing out the epistemic and institutional advantages of reasoning 
by analogy).  
 14. See, e.g., William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL 
AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 176–93 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) (discussing the 
gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities surrounding the four perspectives that dominate theoretical 
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theoriesprincipally normative in orientationpropose a unifying 
principle for a regime and then explicate that principle in different 
parts of the law. They prize consistency and coherence across time and 
context. In the process though, they either classify deviations as 
anomalies or creatively reinterpret them as being driven indirectly by 
the same unifying principle. The diversity of scholarship that follows 
this pattern captures the pervasiveness of this phenomenon. To law 
and economics scholars, such as William Landes and Richard Posner, 
the entire field of intellectual property law is driven by a core concern 
for promoting economic efficiency, minimizing transaction costs, and 
providing creators with an incentive to create.15 To libertarians, such 
as Richard Epstein, intellectual property law is in the end about 
“property” and therefore imbued with classical liberal values.16 Others 
have made similar claims about specific types of intellectual property. 
Jane Ginsburg, for instance, has long argued that copyright law is 
about “authorship” and the centrality of authorial control over creative 
works.17 In a similar vein, Roberta Kwall has argued that copyright 
law should be understood as a mechanism to protect the intrinsic 
dimension of creativity—the morality of authorship.18 Regardless of 
ideology, the search for a grand theory continues to dominate the 
intellectual property landscape.19  
Normative coherence, however, does not require a single 
overarching value, or indeed even a finite set of values. It can at once 
acknowledge the incommensurability of the various values involved 
and strive to accommodate them institutionally. For centuries now, 
the common law method has done just this, enabling it to 
accommodate and affirm a host of otherwise conflicting values through 
a process of practical reasoning. And indeed common law intellectual 
property regimes build on this basic feature of the common law, an 
attribute that its detractors ignore. 
Much of the skepticism about common law intellectual property 
derives from the prevalent discontent today with the common law 
 
writing about intellectual property: Utilitarianism, Labor Theory, Personality Theory, and Social 
Planning Theory). 
 15. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 4 (2003). 
 16. Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal 
Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 456, 520–21 (2010). 
 17. Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1063, 1091–92 (2003). 
 18. ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW 
FOR THE UNITED STATES, at xiii-xviii (2010). 
 19. See Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 260 (2006) (noting the absence of 
“giant-sized” theories of intellectual property and observing that “there should be” such theories). 
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method.20 The common law, its skeptics argue, emerged in a much 
simpler world, where the law focused more on resolving disputes and 
less on guiding parties in their future actions.21 In today’s complex 
world, sophisticated parties need greater certainty and ex ante 
guidance, rather than nuanced lawmaking. Certainty, however, has 
its own costs. Given that creativity and innovation are almost always 
sequential,22 any regime has to balance not just exclusionary control 
and the public benefit, but also the incentives for a primary creator 
and a secondary creator. No bright-line ex ante regime can anticipate 
the nature and forms of creativity at both ends and balance them 
optimally for all times to come. In certain contexts, then, situational 
flexibility may be more valuable than the certainty derived from 
inadequate information.  
The method of pragmatic incrementalism that courts follow in 
common law intellectual property builds on this recognition and 
avoids several of the major pitfalls that have plagued the federal 
intellectual property regimes. Courts here remain aware of the 
intertemporal problems inherent in granting plaintiffs open-ended, 
property-like exclusionary control over an intangible. Consequently, 
courts have developed techniques to avoid these problems and 
mitigate their effects—proceeding with caution, balancing multiple 
values or interests, looking to the context and necessities of an area to 
tailor a rule, and paying close attention to the actual practical 
consequences that flow from a rule so as to reformulate it when 
needed. Incrementalism, flexibility, and contextuality are thus central 
to the way in which these rights are developed and applied, but are 
features that courts operating under the statutory regimes today have 
struggled to implement. Yet, hardly anyone has thought it wise to look 
to the common law and state intellectual property regimes for 
structural and substantive guidance. If change in intellectual property 
law is to move beyond being just rhetoric, it needs to be creative and 
 
 20. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Failure of the Common Law, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 765, 
781–82 (2004) [hereinafter Schauer, Common Law] (describing the process through which this 
skepticism developed, and contributing to it); see also Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad 
Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 917–18 (2006) [hereinafter Schauer, Bad Law] (suggesting that 
case-based rulemaking that is dependent on concrete facts may have distorting qualities). 
 21. Schauer, Common Law, supra note 20, at 781. 
 22. This reality is often described as the “on the shoulders of giants” effect. YOCHAI 
BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND 
FREEDOM 37 (2006); see also Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
1105, 1109 (1990) (describing intellectual property as derivative because “[e]ach advance stands 
on building blocks fashioned by prior thinkers”); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders 
of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 40 (1991) (discussing 
how to divide joint profits among innovators when one innovator builds his product off another’s 
product). 
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include options that are now ignored for no reason other than sheer 
path dependence. In this Article, I argue that looking to common law 
intellectual property regimes ought to figure prominently in that set of 
options. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets out the idea of 
common law intellectual property by providing a brief overview of the 
more popular regimes, focusing on their common law genesis and use 
of ideas from contract, tort, and restitution law to simulate the 
functioning of property rights. Part II describes the theory and 
practice of pragmatic incrementalism in common law intellectual 
property. It begins by looking to the connection between common law 
incrementalism, decisional minimalism, and legal pragmatism to 
disaggregate four practical attributes of pragmatic incrementalism: (1) 
the use of caution in the face of uncertainty; (2) the use of 
semantically value-neutral language; (3) the use of custom to shape 
the scope and breadth of a rule; and (4) the emphasis on balancing a 
rule’s consequences (the ex ante) with its application (the ex post). 
Part II then examines how common law intellectual property regimes 
make use of the attributes of pragmatic incrementalism, drawing on 
examples and illustrations from the regimes of Part I.  
Part III extrapolates lessons from the workings of these 
regimes and their use of pragmatic incrementalism for intellectual 
property reform. This Part focuses on the use of courts and the 
common law process as unappreciated alternatives to legislatures and 
statutes. It looks to the value of eclecticism and practical reasoning as 
substantive alternatives to grand theorization.  
Part IV anticipates and addresses possible objections to the 
working of pragmatic incrementalism. Specifically, it addresses 
arguments that the model of pragmatic incrementalism is inherently 
“conservative” and unlikely to bring about genuine change, that it 
ignores the virtues of federalism and uniformity, and that it pays 
insufficient attention to the systemic deficiencies of the common law. 
Part V then tests the discussion and analysis of pragmatic 
incrementalism by applying it to the fashion industry, an area where 
scholars and legislators are currently debating the need for 
intellectual property protection. It shows how the debates have 
ignored the possibility of a common law solution to tailor protection to 
the needs of the industry, while avoiding the costs associated with 
such protection. While Parts I and II are largely positive in their 
analysis, Parts III, IV, and V are primarily normative. 
It is worth emphasizing that I am not arguing for the 
replacement of all statutory intellectual property regimes with 
common law alternatives. My normative claims in this Article are two-
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fold. First, that some forms of informational resources, to the extent 
that they merit protection at all, would benefit from a common law 
approach to protection. Discussions of institutional design in 
intellectual property have thus far paid little attention to the potential 
benefits of the common law. Thinking creatively, scholars and 
policymakers ought to recognize the viability of common law 
protection as an alternative to one-size-fits-all statutory approaches. 
Second, even within the world of federal statutory intellectual 
property, courts should understand a larger number of statutory 
provisions as actively delegating lawmaking power to them. Federal 
courts should embrace pragmatic incrementalism in intellectual 
property protection whenever needed, and be far less dogmatic about 
deferring to Congress for guidance.  
My choice of state common law regimes to explicate the 
functioning of pragmatic incrementalism is certainly not to contrast 
state law with federal law. Neither is it directed at showing that the 
trademark, copyright, and patent regimes have consciously disavowed 
any reliance on the common law method. Several features of 
pragmatic incrementalism may indeed be found in the functioning of 
parts of the federal intellectual property regimes, even though the 
overlay of statutory regulations and administrative rules has resulted 
in the common law-like parts receding in importance. Rather, this 
choice is to illustrate how courts are well equipped to develop rules for 
intellectual property in the absence of direction from legislatures and 
the process by which they can continue to do so in coordination with 
legislative intervention that takes their lawmaking role seriously. The 
fact that most common law in the United States is today state law 
rather than federal law is thus a descriptive reality that this choice 
represents, rather than a prescriptive one. I leave for future work a 
fuller discussion of how the federal regimes might do well to integrate 
common law rule development into their framework and functioning, 
and indeed the costs and benefits that this might entail. 
I. COMMON LAW REGIMES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: AN OVERVIEW 
Common law intellectual property has thus far received little 
systematic analysis. While scholars have long studied individual 
common law regimes to understand their place in the overall 
intellectual property framework,23 hardly anyone has sought to 
 
 23. Indeed, treatises have been written analyzing several common law intellectual property 
regimes independently. See, e.g., J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY 
(2d ed. 2009); ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS (2009). 
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examine the one unifying factor that connects these different 
regimes—their genesis in the common law. What does it mean for an 
intellectual property regime to have originated in the common law? 
First, it implies that judicial decisions are the principal source 
of legal rules for the regime. The common law is judge-made law.24 
This is not the same as statutory interpretation, where judges fill gaps 
in a statutory enactment. In the common law, the absence of 
legislation is seen as an active delegation of lawmaking power to 
courts. Courts extrapolate rules and principles from their prior 
decisions, applying them to the specific dispute at hand. In the 
process, the court fashions a new rule or exception by drawing from 
disparate areas of tort, contract, restitution, and property law—
relying entirely on logic and experience.25 
In an effort to harmonize the law across different states, some 
state legislatures have codified these common law intellectual 
property regimes.26 This process has impeded courts’ ability to rely 
exclusively on case law as their source of rules. Nonetheless, courts 
continue to develop the law as needed, often independent of the 
statutes, and in the traditional, if somewhat attenuated, common law 
method. Courts work in tandem with legislatures in these contexts, 
retaining a secondary, but significant, role. 
Second, the idea of intellectual property in these regimes is 
intricately connected to the concept of common law property. Common 
law property interests revolve around the idea of exclusion and use a 
variety of mechanisms to render it operational.27 Since the common 
 
 24. See Frederick Schauer, Is the Common Law Law?, 77 CAL. L. REV. 455, 455 (1989) 
(“[C]ommon law rules are not made by legislatures; they are created by courts simultaneously 
with the application of those rules to concrete cases.”). 
 25. For some prominent work on the common law process, see generally BENJAMIN N. 
CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 1–3, 11 (1924) (referencing the strengths and weaknesses of 
the common law and describing the need for a restatement to provide certainty of the law and 
the need for a philosophy of law as an aid to growth); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW 
TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 16 (1960) (identifying and discussing fourteen factors that 
regularly have bearing on how common law is made through the decision of appellate cases); 
ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW, at xi–xiv (1921) (discussing the history and 
power of the common law in the Anglo-American system); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path 
of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 (1897) (addressing the reality that “in societies like ours 
the command of the public force is intrusted to the judges in certain cases, and the whole power 
of the state will be put forth, if necessary, to carry out their judgments and decrees”). 
 26. This is most prominent in the context of trade secrets and publicity rights. See infra text 
accompanying notes 41–43, 53–55. 
 27. For accounts of the “right to exclude” in property law, including common law property, 
see generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, 
Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593 (2008) (arguing that 
the right to exclude has always done more than provide an entitlement to injunctive relief in that 
it imposes a duty on the world to stay away from an ownable resource); Thomas W. Merrill, 
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law process involves a bilateral dispute, common law property 
interests are ordinarily relational. In other words, they originate in 
actions alleging an interference with a pre-existing interest, and in 
adjudicating the interference, courts determine the nature and 
existence of the interest alleged to have been interfered with. 
For long, the only reason the distinction between property and 
nonproperty interests mattered was that courts refused to grant 
injunctions for nonproprietary interests.28 Once equity relaxed this 
rule, the distinction ceased to be of much significance. Many of what 
are today termed “common law property interests” originated in 
tortious, contractual, or quasi-contractual settings.29 They continue to 
be called “property” interests because they convey an ex ante 
possibility of exclusion in certain situations. Thus, trespassory action 
is ordinarily referred to as a property action even though exclusion is 
tied to a defendant’s actions (that is, the wrong); the same is true of 
common law intellectual property regimes. The idea of “property” here 
is subsidiary to the context within which the interest originates, which 
tends to be either contractual (where rights and duties are determined 
by parties themselves) or tortious (where rights and duties are 
prescribed by law). In relation to trade secrets, perhaps the most 
robust common law intellectual property form today, Justice Holmes 
famously remarked: 
The word “property” . . . is an unanalyzed expression of certain secondary consequences 
of the primary fact that the law makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith. 
Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not the defendant knows the facts, 
whatever they are, through a special confidence that he accepted. The property may be 
denied, but the confidence cannot be. Therefore, the starting point of the present matter 
is not property . . . but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the 
plaintiffs . . . .30 
 
Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998) (discussing why the right to 
exclude is fundamental to the concept property); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What 
Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 358–60 (2001) (describing 
property as a “bundle of rights” including the right to exclude, which places a duty of abstention 
on the world). 
 28. See Balganesh, supra note 27, at 642–43 (discussing how courts formerly turned to 
equitable remedies to protect property, resorting to injunctive relief); Roscoe Pound, Equitable 
Relief Against Defamation and Personality, 29 HARV. L. REV. 640, 640–48 (1916) (discussing this 
difference and noting its artificiality). 
 29. The recent doctrine of ‘cybertrespass’ is one such example. See Richard A. Epstein, 
Cybertrespass, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 79–82 (2003) (discussing how courts have applied common 
law chattel trespass doctrines to the Internet); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Common Law Property 
Metaphors on the Internet: The Real Problem with the Doctrine of Cybertrespass, 12 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 265, 314-22 (2006) (discussing the problems inherent in extending 
trespass to chattels to the Internet using cybertrespass).  
 30. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917). 
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In other words, the idea of property as used in the context of 
trade secrets is largely relational. The right to exclude originates in a 
very specific set of circumstances, and identifying these unique 
circumstances remains the law’s principal concern. The same is true, 
in various shades, of almost all forms of common law intellectual 
property, often bringing into question their very classification as 
“property.” The relational nature of these interests also reduces the 
social costs associated with exclusionary (that is, monopoly) control. 
Since exclusion operates only in a very limited set of circumstances, 
these regimes effectively minimize the static and dynamic 
inefficiencies traditionally associated with property rights in 
nonrivalrous and nonexcludable resources.31  
The remainder of this Part provides a concise summary of some 
of the more prominent common law intellectual property regimes. My 
principal objective here is to illustrate how their common law origin 
influences their structure and functioning. 
A. Trade Secrets: Between Property, Tort, and Contract 
Trade secret law, which protects valuable information, is a 
combination of common law contract, property, and tort principles. A 
trade secret claim ordinarily involves three elements: (1) the subject 
matter of protection must be information of economic value to a 
plaintiff; (2) the holder of the information must have taken reasonable 
precautions to prevent its disclosure (also known as the “secrecy 
requirement”); and (3) the secret needs to have been 
misappropriated—that is, improperly acquired, used, or disclosed.32  
Causes of action for the misappropriation of trade secrets date 
back to mid-nineteenth century state common law.33 The law of trade 
secrets, as Mark Lemley notes, originated in the interconnection of 
 
 31. For an overview of these inefficiencies, see LANDES & POSNER, supra note 15, at 13 
(discussing how traditional property rights are inefficient because they do not incentivize 
creation or improvement to develop future benefits). 
 32. See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 37 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing the definition of a trade secret); 
see also Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(2)–1(4), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985). 
 33. See, e.g., Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 523, 527 (1837) (upholding a contractual 
agreement involving sale of an exclusive trade secret). Some scholars trace it back to Roman law. 
See A. Arthur Schiller, Trade Secrets and the Roman Law: The Actio Servi Corrupti, 30 COLUM. 
L. REV. 837, 840–45 (1930) (arguing that Roman businessmen were protected against unfair 
competition through the legal action of actio servi corrupti or “action for making a slave worse”). 
Others have called into question any connection between trade secrets and Roman law. See Alan 
Watson, Trade Secrets and Roman Law: The Myth Exploded, 11 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 19, 19 
(1996) (stating that “there is not the slightest evidence” that actio servi corrupti was ever used as 
Schiller suggests). 
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many common law doctrines: breach of confidence, breach of 
confidentiality, common law misappropriation, unfair competition, 
unjust enrichment, and trespass.34 Courts then restructured this as a 
tort governing business relationships, and eventually the law of trade 
secrets emerged.35  
As a result of borrowing from multiple areas, the underlying 
theoretical basis of trade secret law remains unclear. Early courts 
often spoke of trade secrets as property interests.36 By the mid-
twentieth century, this had shifted, and courts came to view trade 
secret law as a branch of tort law, originating in a defendant’s bad-
faith behavior.37 Eventually, the dominant view shifted to 
understanding trade secret law as a combination of contract and 
property principles.38 To this day, scholars disagree on the area’s 
theoretical underpinnings.39 Some go so far as to argue that the 
 
 34. Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 311, 316 (2008). 
 35. Id. 
 36. This view developed largely for instrumental purposes—to avoid the restriction being 
termed a restraint on trade, or to allow for injunctive relief. See Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 
452, 457 (1868) (granting injunctive relief to an entrepreneur whose trade secret was stolen by a 
former employee and stating that “[i]f a man establishes a business and makes it valuable by his 
skill and attention, the good will of that business is recognized by the law as property”). For an 
elaborate analysis of this phenomenon, see Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: 
Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 253–55 (1998) (suggesting that courts 
formalistically converted trade secrets into property in order to provide an equitable remedy, 
avoid the need for privity, and to prevent a contract conveying trade secrets from being classified 
as an unlawful restraint on trade); Miguel Deutch, The Property Concept of Trade Secrets in 
Anglo-American Law: An Ongoing Debate, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 313, 316–18 (1997) (discussing 
how many have supported the view that trade secrets are an in rem right); Lemley, supra note 
34, at 324–26 (discussing how trade secrets are both similar to and different from other 
“property”). 
 37. Lemley, supra note 34, at 320; see also 1 MELVIN F, JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 1:3 
(West 2010) (“Since the beginning, the focus of U.S. trade secret cases has been on penalizing a 
breach of confidence and trust by the trade secret misappropriator.”). 
 38. See, e.g., Thornton Robison, The Confidence Game: An Approach to the Law About Trade 
Secrets, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 347, 389 (1983) (arguing that the difficulty in balancing the competing 
interests in innovation and industrial mortality has “led firms with trade secrets to seek 
protection through restrictive covenants and a tort of misappropriation”). 
 39. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 36, at 243 (noting how “there is no such thing as a normative 
autonomous body of trade secret law”); Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon or Intellectual 
Property Olympian? A Normative Framework Supporting Trade Secret Law, 8 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 69, 69, 93–116 (1999) (noting the existence of a “normative gap” in trade secret law, but 
disagreeing with Bone and attempting to fill it using a variety of policy-based justifications); 
David D. Friedman, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Trade Secret 
Law, 5. J. ECON. PERSP. 61, 61–62 (1991) (observing how “there is in a sense no law of trade 
secrets” but nonetheless attempting to justify the common law approach to trade secrets in 
economic terms); Lemley, supra note 34, at 312 (“Courts and scholars have struggled for over a 
century to figure out why we protect trade secrets.”). 
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inability to discern a coherent theory for the area necessitates 
abandoning it in favor of individual common law doctrines.40 
While trade secrets originated as a state common law doctrine, 
in 1979 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws drafted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”), recognizing 
the need to “clarify” and “harmonize” the laws of different states.41 An 
overwhelming majority of states have since adopted the UTSA.42 Yet, 
the legislation seems to have done little to curtail common law 
development in the area, both under and independent of the statute.43 
The statutory provisions tend to form no more than a starting point 
for courts’ analysis, which then proceeds in traditional common law 
fashion. This greater than usual willingness to adopt a common law 
approach within the statutory framework may, in turn, derive from 
the reality that the statute itself sought to do no more than codify 
rules that were essentially judge-made. 
B. Publicity Rights: From Privacy to Property 
Publicity rights originated as a branch of the common law of 
torts and over time gradually evolved into full-blown property rights. 
Publicity rights create an ownership interest in a set of characteristics 
evoking the recognition of a natural person when used.44 As one 
commentator put it, these rights protect “the inherent right of every 
human being to control the commercial use of his or her identity.”45 A 
cause of action for a right of publicity infringement requires a showing 
that: (1) the plaintiff owns an enforceable right in the identity or 
 
 40. See Bone, supra note 36, at 302–04. For a critical evaluation of Bone’s position, see 
Lemley, supra note 34, at 328–29. 
 41. Linda B. Samuels & Bryan K. Johnson, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act: The States’ 
Response, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 49, 49–50 (1990). 
 42. As of March 2010, forty-six states had enacted the UTSA into law. 1 JAGER, supra note 
37, § 3:29. 
 43. What is perhaps most interesting is that some states adopting the UTSA sought to 
preempt all common law claims for trade secret misappropriation that predated their adoption of 
the UTSA, while other legislatures only preempted common law doctrine that was in “conflict” 
with the UTSA. In these latter states, independent common-law-based causes of action for 
misappropriation of trade secrets continue to coexist with the statutory causes of action. See K.C. 
Multimedia, Inc. v. Bank of Am. Tech. & Operations, Inc., 171 Cal. App. 4th 939, 955–56 (2009) 
(noting this distinction and applying it to the California statute); see also Powell Prods., Inc. v. 
Marks, 948 F. Supp. 1469, 1474 (D. Colo. 1996) (discussing the Colorado statute); Micro Display 
Sys., Inc. v. Axtel, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 202, 204 (D. Minn. 1988) (discussing the Minnesota statute); 
Burbank Grease Servs., LLC v. Sokolowski, 717 N.W.2d 781, 788–90 (Wis. 2006) (discussing the 
Wisconsin statute). 
 44. Melissa B. Jacoby & Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring the 
Uncharted Boundaries of the Right of Publicity, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1322, 1328 (2002). 
 45. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 1:3. 
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persona of a natural person; (2) the defendant, without consent, used 
some aspect of identity or persona such that plaintiff is identifiable 
from the use; and (3) such use is likely to injure the commercial value 
of the plaintiff’s identity.46 
Publicity rights originated as a branch of tort law dealing with 
personal privacy.47 Early decisions relied on a theory of implied 
contract between plaintiff and defendant.48 Thereafter, the theory 
developed into a tort-based one, focusing on the nature of the 
defendant’s use—whether the defendant had used the plaintiff’s name 
or likeness for “some advantage.”49 In this formulation, courts viewed 
publicity rights as largely nonproprietary and thus incapable of being 
assigned or alienated like other property rights.50 By the mid-
twentieth century, with the tortious element limited to commercial 
situations, courts began to treat plaintiffs’ interests as full-blown 
property rights. This conception reached its culmination in Haelan 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,51 where the court 
recognized the plaintiff’s “right to grant the exclusive privilege of 
publishing his picture”52 and understood it to be fully transferable 
without restrictions.53  
 
 46. 1 id. § 3:2. 
 47. These rights are ordinarily traced back to the famous 1890 law review article by Samuel 
Warren and Louis Brandeis. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 
HARV. L. REV. 193, 193–95 (1890) (tracing the development of privacy rights); see also Melville B. 
Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 203–04 (1954) (attributing the 
doctrine to Warren and Brandeis’s article). But see William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 
383, 401 (1960) (arguing that Warren and Brandeis did not direct attention to publicity rights in 
their discussion of privacy). For the earliest case recognizing a common-law-based publicity right 
and tracing it to the right of privacy, see Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 50 S.E. 68, 
74–76 (Ga. 1905) (recognizing that the publication of a picture of a person, without his consent, 
for a commercial purpose constituted a violation of the right of privacy). 
 48. See, e.g., Holmes v. Underwood & Underwood, 225 A.D. 360, 361–62 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1929) (finding an implied contract existed between a photographer and his client); Klug v. 
Sheriffs, 109 N.W. 656, 657–58 (Wis. 1906) (finding an implied contract existed between a 
painter and a client and that it was a breach of faith for the painter to fashion a painting of the 
client’s deceased wife from retained photos); Pollard v. Photographing Co., (1888) 40 Ch.D. 345 at 
346–50 (Eng.) (holding that the bargain between a customer and the photographer includes, by 
implication, an agreement that the prints are solely for the customer’s use); Prosser, supra note 
47, at 401. 
 49. Prosser, supra note 47, at 403. 
 50. See Nimmer, supra note 47, at 209–10 (“In most jurisdictions it is well established that a 
right of privacy is a personal right rather than a property right and consequently is not 
assignable.”). 
 51. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
 52. Id. at 868. 
 53. For complimentary reviews of the decision, see Nimmer, supra note 47, at 221–23; 
Prosser, supra note 47, at 406–07. 
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In the decades that followed, many states recognized the cause 
of action by statute. As part of that process, they made the right fully 
alienable, and in some instances even descendible.54 Again, much like 
trade secret law, the state level codification seems to have done little 
to impede courts’ incremental development of the area.55  
C. Idea Protection: Implied-in-Fact Contract 
Idea protection law relies entirely on the common law doctrine 
of implied-in-fact contracts to generate a principal of liability. Ideas 
are expressly excluded from the coverage of copyright and patent 
law.56 Yet, occasionally the creator of an idea shares it with others, but 
at the same time seeks to ensure that it isn’t commercially exploited 
against his or her wishes. In situations such as these, the common law 
affords idea-creators tailored protection against bad-faith free riding.57 
The principal common law protection for ideas rests on a theory 
of implied-in-fact contract. The law implies the existence of an actual 
agreement between parties based on their conduct and context.58 Even 
in the absence of an express contractual understanding, state common 
law allows idea-creators to prevent recipients from using it for free in 
situations where: (1) the creator conditions the release of the idea 
 
 54. Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 44, at 1324. 
 55. See, e.g., Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 621 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(interpreting a Kentucky statute and extending it to cover action figures); Elvis Presley Enters. 
v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 191–96 (5th Cir. 1998) (interpreting a Texas statute and extending it to 
restaurant décor); see also Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 44, at 1324–25 n.11 (reviewing 
expansions of the law that have benefited celebrities); Jennifer Rothman, Copyright Preemption 
and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 199, 206–07 n.19 (2002) (detailing some of the 
more problematic expansions). 
 56. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2008) (excluding ideas from the coverage of copyright law). 
Patent law similarly excludes protection for “abstract ideas.” See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM 
ON PATENTS § 1.03[2] (2010) (describing the exclusion of principles and abstract ideas). 
 57. The earliest systematic treatment of the subject dates back to the 1950s. See, e.g., 
Harold C. Havighurst, The Right to Compensation for an Idea, 49 NW. U. L. REV. 295 (1954); 
Benjamin Kaplan, Further Remarks on Compensation for Ideas in California, 46 CAL. L. REV. 
699 (1958); Melville B. Nimmer, The Law of Ideas, 27 S. CAL. L. REV. 119 (1954); Harry R. 
Olsson, Jr., Dreams for Sale: Some Observations on the Law of Idea Submissions and Problems 
Arising Therefrom, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 34 (1958); Joseph D. Pannone, Property Rights in 
an Idea and the Requirement of Concreteness, 33 B.U. L. REV. 396 (1953). 
 58. For an analysis of various other theories that are today preempted by federal copyright 
law, see 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 19D.02 (2010) 
(discussing various legal theories to protect ideas); Lionel S. Sobel, The Law of Ideas, Revisited, 1 
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 9, 32 (1994) (describing available state law protection). Implied contracts are 
to be distinguished from the category of quasi-contract, where the law does not imply an actual 
agreement, but rather imposes a set of obligations on parties that are contract-like, but originate 
in the law, much like tortious principles. See Detroit Tigers, Inc. v. Ignite Sports Media, LLC, 
203 F. Supp. 2d 789, 798–99 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (elaborating on this distinction in the context of 
Illinois law); 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra § 19D.02[B] (discussing “implied-in-law” contracts). 
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upon an obligation to pay for its use; and (2) the recipient knows and 
accepts the condition prior to obtaining the idea.59 Even when the 
condition is not made explicit, courts have been willing to imply its 
existence from the circumstances of the parties’ relationship.60 
Once these requirements are met, courts then move to 
examining the idea’s eligibility for protection.61 Here, the law requires 
a plaintiff to show that the idea was “concrete,” which means either 
that the idea must be ready for immediate use or that it must be 
specific enough to be identifiable.62 The plaintiff must also show that 
it was “novel,” which requires merely that it was not already known in 
the industry.63 
 
 59. See Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987) (denoting the elements 
in the context of California law); Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 128 Cal. App. 3d 628, 646 
(1982) (describing the same analytical framework); 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 58, § 
19D.05[A][2][a][i] (stating these two circumstances as vital at the time an idea is disclosed). 
 60. See Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 802 F.2d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 
1986) (“[T]he contract claim turns . . . upon the implied promise to pay the reasonable value of 
the material disclosed.”); Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 756 (1956) (“[T]he positions occupied 
by the parties should be sufficient to raise the inference that if the literary work is used by the 
prospective buyer, compensation would be paid.”); Gunther-Wahl Prods., Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 104 
Cal. App. 4th 27, 43 (2002) (noting that the assertion of no liability without an express 
agreement was contrary to California law and that the contested instruction improperly 
permitted the argument); Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, Inc., 245 Cal. App. 2d 593, 607 
(1966) (finding a promise to pay if the idea was used); Chandler v. Roach, 156 Cal. App. 2d 435, 
441–42 (1957) (“There is nothing unreasonable in the assumption that a producer would obligate 
himself to pay for the disclosure of an idea which he would otherwise be legally free to use, but 
which in fact, he would be unable to use but for the disclosure.”). 
 61. For a critical overview of these requirements, see Arthur R. Miller, Common Law 
Protections for Products of the Mind: An “Idea” Whose Time Has Yet to Come, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
703 718–32 (2006) (examining why courts adhere to the requirements despite unrelenting 
criticism and finding that concreteness and novelty do not “strike the right balance between 
encouraging market competition and rewarding mental creativity, and avoiding administrative 
and evidentiary difficulties”); see also 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 58, § 19D.06 (discussing 
the requirements and whether they should be necessary); Sobel, supra note 58, at 53–63 
(discussing the requirements and taking issue with the conception of novelty in the Nimmer 
treatise). 
 62. See Miller, supra note 61, at 723–26 (discussing the standard and courts’ application of 
the same); see also Sellers v. Am. Broad. Co., 668 F.2d 1207, 1210 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating the 
essentiality of definiteness and completeness); Hamilton Nat’l Bank v. Belt, 210 F.2d 706, 708 
(D.C. Cir. 1953) (discussing the requirement and explaining that the law doesn’t offer “protection 
to vagueness”); Chandler v. Roach, 319 P.2d 776, 779 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (stating the 
necessity of completeness); Jones v. Ulrich, 95 N.E.2d 113, 120 (Ill. App. Ct. 1950) (noting that 
“the idea to be protected must be concrete to a degree”); Smith v. Recrion Corp., 541 P.2d 663, 
665 (Nev. 1975) (stating the need for concreteness at an idea’s developmental stage). 
 63. See AEB & Assoc. Design Grp., Inc. v. Tonka Corp., 853 F. Supp. 724, 734 (S.D.N.Y. 
1994) (“[A] plaintiff may not claim that an idea is original if it was already in use in the industry 
at the time of the submission.”) (citing McGhan v. Ebersol, 608 F. Supp. 277, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985)); Paul v. Haley, 588 N.Y.S.2d 897, 902–03 (App. Div. 1992) (noting that an idea merits 
protection if it shows innovation and goes beyond existing knowledge); 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, 
supra note 58, § 19D.06[B][1] (“[N]ovel ideas are those that are new, in the sense that they are 
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Before federal copyright law preempted much of the area in 
1976, idea protection under state law was far more extensive than 
what it is today. Despite this federal preemption, state common law 
continues to protect ideas through a cause of action that is largely 
relational.  
D. Misappropriation: Quasi Property 
The doctrine of misappropriation, another product of common 
law evolution, protects factual information ordinarily ineligible for 
protection under copyright and patent law. Misappropriation 
originated in the Supreme Court’s decision in International News 
Services v. Associated Press.64 The case involved one news 
conglomerate lifting the new reports of a competitor from publicly 
available newspapers and bulletin boards, and using them in its own 
print newspapers. Conceding that the subject matter (news) was 
outside the coverage of copyright law, the plaintiff argued that equity 
and the impropriety of “reaping without sowing” necessitated 
recognizing a property right in news, vested in its collector.65 To its 
credit, the Court recognized both the need to prevent one business 
from free riding on the efforts of another and the problems inherent in 
granting a collector of valuable information unbounded property-like 
in rem control over it. Balancing the two, it formulated the category of 
“quasi property” that recognized the valuable nature of the time-
sensitive factual information exclusively between two competitors 
“irrespective of the rights of either as against the public.”66 Within a 
limited setting, the right mimics the effects of in rem protection, using 
the framework of unjust enrichment—hence “quasi” property.67 
Because of both the demise of federal general common law in the years 
 
not already being used in the industry for which they are proposed.”); Miller, supra note 61, at 
726–27 (“[C]ourts generally require the plaintiff’s idea to reflect a spark of inventiveness or a 
measurable quantity of creative genius beyond what was generally known in the trade.”).  
 64. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). For more on the decision and its background, see generally Douglas 
G. Baird, The Story of INS v. AP: Property, Natural Monopoly, and the Uneasy Legacy of a 
Concocted Controversy, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 9 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle 
Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006) (discussing AP’s strategic promotion of the idea of news as property, 
the relationship between INS and AP, and the reception of the case in the lower courts); Baird, 
supra note 2 (examining the misappropriation doctrine and its origin in the decision). 
65. See Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 239–40. 
 66. Id. at 219. 
 67. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, “Hot News”: The Enduring Myth of Property in News, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (discussing the unjust enrichment origins of the 
misappropriation doctrine and its relationship with traditional conceptions of property).  
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following the decision,68 and the federal preemption of copyright-like 
causes,69 litigants have invoked this doctrine with less frequency.70 All 
the same, the doctrine continues to subsist in several states. 
More recently, the Supreme Court has reiterated that factual 
information of the nature protected in International News might 
sometimes merit protection under a theory of unfair competition.71 
Accordingly, state common law courts have reconstructed the 
misappropriation doctrine to overcome federal copyright preemption, 
limiting protection to circumstances where no protection is available—
all on an amorphous theory of unfair competition.72 The most 
prominent of these reconstructions is the “hot news doctrine,” which 
allows recovery when: (1) the plaintiff gathers information at a cost; 
(2) the information is time-sensitive; (3) the defendant free-rides on 
such information; (4) the defendant is competing directly with the 
plaintiff; and (5) such free riding would reduce the incentive to 
produce the product or service, substantially threatening its existence 
or quality.73 A principal limiting feature of the doctrine in this 
construction is the existence of “direct competition” between the 
plaintiff and the defendant. While courts have interpreted the 
 
 68. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“There is no federal general 
common law.”). 
 69. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2008) (“[N]o person is entitled to any such right or equivalent 
right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.”). 
 70. Cf. Bruce P. Keller, Condemned to Repeat the Past: The Reemergence of 
Misappropriation and Other Common Law Theories of Protection for Intellectual Property, 11 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 402 (1997) (“Since the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act, with its 
broad preemption provisions, most had regarded misappropriation as a theory of liability that 
had lost its vitality.”). 
 71. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 354 (1991) (quoting 1 NIMMER & 
NIMMER, supra note 58, § 3.04). 
 72. See, e.g., Standard & Poor’s Corp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 683 F.2d 704, 711 (2d Cir. 
1982) (affirming the finding of irreparable harm with respect to the misappropriation claim on 
the basis of such a theory); Roy Exp. Co. Establishment of Vaduz, Liech. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 
Inc., 672 F.2d 1095, 1106 (2d Cir. 1982) (“Application of state unfair competition laws to 
unpublished works protected by common-law copyright is preserved from preemption.”); Bd. of 
Trade of Chi. v. Dow Jones & Co., 456 N.E.2d 84, 93 (Ill. 1983) (explaining misappropriation as 
“a combination of unjust enrichment and competitive injury”); U.S. Sporting Prods., Inc. v. 
Johnny Stewart Game Calls, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 214, 217 (Tex. App. 1993) (describing 
misappropriation’s theoretical basis in unfair competition and declaring that the “tort of 
misappropriation takes root in federal common law”); Mercury Record Prods., Inc. v. Econ. 
Consultants, Inc., 218 N.W.2d 705, 715–16 (Wis. 1974) (setting forth unfair competition as a 
flexible doctrine and asserting its “affirmative duty to protect rights that have arisen in the 
course of the centuries of the evolution of the common law”).  
 73. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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requirement with varying degrees of stringency,74 at a minimum the 
doctrine does not extend to noncommercial or private appropriations 
(unlike copyright law), thereby reducing the social costs of protection.  
Of the different common law intellectual property regimes in 
existence, misappropriation is perhaps the most open-ended, and is 
often used as a catch-all, residual category. It is precisely for this 
reason that historically, courts have made concerted efforts to limit its 
application.75 It nonetheless remains viable. 
E. Common Law Copyright: Literary Property 
Common law copyright is the oldest of all common law 
intellectual property regimes, having been in existence since the very 
origins of copyright law.76 Despite controversies over its existence in 
England and later under federal law,77 common law copyright 
survived federal preemption and remains a viable basis for protection 
under state law.78  
To qualify for protection under common law copyright, 
expression needs to be beyond the purview of federal copyright law’s 
coverage. It thus usually extends to two categories of works: (1) 
subject matter that does not qualify as a “work of authorship” under 
the copyright statute;79 and (2) works that are not “fixed” in a tangible 
medium of expression, as mandated by federal law.80 Sound recordings 
 
 74. See, e.g., U.S. Golf Ass’n v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-Max, Inc., 749 F.2d 1028, 1037–40 
(3d Cir. 1984) (denying a claim because competition was indirect); Bd. of Trade of Chi., 456 
N.E.2d at 89–90 (allowing a claim despite the absence of direct competition).  
 75. Judge Learned Hand, when on the Second Circuit, was well-known for his skepticism of 
the doctrine, attempting to cabin its application on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Millinery 
Creators' Guild, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 109 F.2d 175, 177 (2d Cir. 1940) (“[T]he public 
interest is best served by limiting the protection afforded an idea to the particular chattel in 
which it is embodied.”); Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929) (“[I]n 
the absence of some recognized right at common law, or under the statutes . . . a man's property 
is limited to the chattels which embody his invention.”).  
 76. See supra note 4 (discussing the origins of common law copyright in England). 
 77. For a succinct discussion of the debate in England at the time, see Ronan Deazley, The 
Myth of Copyright at Common Law, 62 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 106, 132–33 (2003) (describing the 
historical context of the modern law of copyright and focusing on “the common good as the 
organizing principle . . . of copyright regulation”). For an exhaustive discussion of the debate 
under federal U.S. law, see Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright 
Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119, 1186 (1983) 
(tracing the evolution of the debate from the pre-Constitutional era forward and finding that 
“assertions of the existence of common law copyright as a historical fact are in error”). 
 78. Common law copyright was the primary target of the copyright statute’s preemption 
provision. Yet, the way in which the provision came to be drafted allowed common law copyright 
to thrive unimpeded, in pockets. See Goldstein, supra note 3, at 1110–23. 
 79. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 58, § 2.02. 
 80. Id. 
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fixed before 1972 are an example of the former,81 while 
extemporaneous speeches,82 unrecorded choreography, and 
improvisational performances83 (for example, jazz performances84) are 
examples of the latter. Protection under common law copyright 
usually subsists only as long as the work remains unpublished. Once 
published, a work loses common law protection regardless of its 
eligibility for protection under federal copyright law.85 
Once covered by common law copyright, expression is protected 
by a set of rights roughly analogous to those of federal copyright law.86 
However, common law copyright remains more expansive than 
statutory copyright in two important respects. First, unlike federal 
copyright law, it subsists into perpetuity without a defined temporal 
limit. Second, it isn’t subject to the same kinds of exceptions and 
limitations that exist under federal copyright law.87  
Whether common law copyright contains a fair use limitation 
was, until recently, largely a matter of speculation.88 While some 
courts had hinted at its existence in dicta, none had officially endorsed 
it, even though scholars had argued for such limits.89 In a recent 
decision, a New York state court expressly acknowledged that a fair 
use doctrine was part of the state’s common law copyright regime. The 
decision gleaned from federal law and noted how fair use actually 
 
 81. This is a consequence of section 301(c), which explicitly provides that common law 
copyright for sound recordings fixed before 1972 is to subsist until the year 2067. 17 U.S.C. § 
301(c) (2008); see also Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250, 263 (N.Y. 
2005) (finding pre-1972 sound recordings to be protected by New York’s common law copyright 
regime). 
 82. See Williams v. Weisser, 273 Cal. App. 2d 726, 740–41 (1969) (finding that speeches 
delivered orally can be the subject of state copyright); cf. Falwell v. Penthouse Int’l, 521 F. Supp. 
1204, 1208 (W.D. Va. 1981) (denying protection for an extemporaneous interview in the absence 
of clear segregation); Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 255–57 (N.Y. 
1968) (rejecting common law copyright protection for conversations when they had not been 
clearly demarcated). 
 83. See generally Gregory S. Donat, Note, Fixing Fixation: A Copyright with Teeth for 
Improvisational Performers, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1375–77 (1997) (noting the problems with 
common law copyright protection for improvisational performances). 
 84. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 58, § 8C.02. 
 85. 1 id. § 2.02. 
 86. 2 id. § 8C.02. 
 87. Most of which have, in the statutory context, come to be codified. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 108–
112 (2008). 
 88. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 58, § 8C.02 (discussing support for the proposition 
“that fair use forms part of common law copyright doctrine, properly construed”). 
 89. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250, 267 (N.Y. 2005) 
(discussing the federal doctrine and finding “no justification for adopting a different rule of state 
law”); Hemingway’s Estate v. Random House, Inc., 279 N.Y.S.2d 51, 57 (Sup. Ct. 1967) 
(discussing the doctrine’s justification).  
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furthers the regime’s goals—illustrative of the common law process 
through which the regime continues to develop.90 
II. PRAGMATIC INCREMENTALISM AND COMMON LAW 
 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Today, there is no dearth of theories attempting to explain the 
common law method of lawmaking. They range from those that view 
the common law as attempting to maximize one or more basic values 
(for example, efficiency or corrective justice) to those that believe in 
the common law being entirely the product of individual, context-
based adjudication.91 Pragmatic incrementalism belongs to the latter 
category and draws from the overlapping ideas of common law 
incrementalism, decisional minimalism, and legal pragmatism.  
Richard Posner, the most ardent defender of legal pragmatism 
today, associates the school with three “essential” elements.92 The first 
is “antifoundationalism”—a distrust of metaphysical explanations or 
grand theories that seek to determine the content of the law by 
 
 90. EMI Records Ltd. v. Premise Media Corp., No. 601209-08, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 7485, 
at *41 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 13, 2008) (denying preliminary injunction). 
 91. See, e.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 3 (1991) 
(explaining that the common law “consists of the rules that would be generated at the present 
moment by application of the institutional principles that govern common law adjudication”); 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 98 (1972) (surveying the common law fields 
and concluding that “the common law exhibits a deep unity that is economic in character”); 
POUND, supra note 25, at 183 (explaining the basis for the common law and emphasizing that 
such law “is to be discovered by judicial and juristic experience of the rules and principles which 
in the past have accomplished or have failed to accomplish justice”); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE 
IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 223–27 (1995) (describing the exercise of judgment and the determinacy or 
corrective justice); Holmes, supra note 25, at 461 (viewing the law as “prophecies of what the 
courts will do in fact”); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient 
Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 65 (1977) (arguing the pervasiveness of “the tendency of the set of all 
legal rules to become dominated by rules achieving efficient . . . allocative effects”); Richard A. 
Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 488 (1980) (“[W]ealth maximization, especially in the common law setting, 
derives support from the principle of consent that can also be regarded as underlying the 
otherwise quite different approach of Pareto ethics.”); Gerald J. Postema, Philosophy of the 
Common Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 588, 620 
(Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro, eds., 2002) (emphasizing “the conventional foundations of law” 
and exploring “a practiced discipline of public practical reasoning” as a vital and “defining 
feature of law”); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 51 
(1977) (“[T]he efficient rule situation noted by Posner is due to an evolutionary mechanism 
whose direction proceeds from the utility maximizing decisions of disputants rather than from 
the wisdom of judges.”). 
 92. Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1653, 1660 
(1990). 
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reference to one or more core values.93 The second is the belief that 
legal rules are best valued by their actual consequences, both short- 
and long-term.94 Unlike schools of legal thought that advocate 
adhering to coherent rules independent of their impact, pragmatism 
remains heavily “instrumental.”95 The third is legal pragmatism’s 
insistence that decisionmaking be contextualized, rather than 
abstracted or rendered “objective.”96 Contextualization refers to the 
belief that all thinking remains deeply embedded in social practice 
and that attempts to disaggregate the two are futile. In a sense, this 
idea builds on the antifoundationalism that is central to legal 
pragmatism.97 
Antifoundationalism, instrumentalism, and contextualization 
thus form the central tenets of legal pragmatism. These principles, 
however, focus not just on the substantive content of the law, but also 
on the lawmaking process itself. In other words, they also provide us 
with a reason why pragmatic decisionmaking in the common law 
remains characterized by an incremental (or gradual) process of rule 
development.  
Incrementalism refers to a characteristic of lawmaking that 
favors narrow, circumstantially-tailored decisions—a feature that its 
protagonists often describe as decisional “narrowness.”98 From a 
normative standpoint, decisional “narrowness” can come about for a 
variety of reasons. It can arise when courts intentionally avoid 
addressing politically divisive issues thereby facilitating democratic 
deliberation, as commonly seen in the constitutional context.99 This is 
often referred to as minimalism in the context of constitutional 
 
 93. For early uses of this term in the context of philosophical pragmatism, see ANTI-
FOUNDATIONALISM AND PRACTICAL REASONING: CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN HERMENEUTICS AND 
ANALYSIS (E. Simpson ed., 1987); Posner, supra note 92, at 1659. 
 94. See Posner, supra note 92, at 1657 (describing this feature as the “forward-looking” 
attribute of pragmatism). 
 95. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 95 (1986) (castigating pragmatism for failing to 
respect the past for its “own sake”). 
 96. Posner, supra note 92, at 1660–61. 
 97. See Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 799 (1989) 
(“The pragmatists’ first thesis—that knowledge is essentially contextual, situated in habit and 
practice—holds that no such zero-based method of inquiry is possible.”). 
 98. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 
10 (1999) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE]; Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. 
L. REV. 353, 362–64 (2006) [hereinafter Sunstein, Minimalism].  
 99. For an elaboration of the virtues of this process, see SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE, supra note 
98, at 3 (describing this process as that of “[l]eaving things undecided”); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1752–53 (1995) (arguing that 
because judges lack a “democratic pedigree” they should avoid deciding cases based on “large 
theories” that cut against the democratic process). 
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adjudication. Alternatively, it can come about because of a strong 
belief in the value of precedent—in the virtues of deviating from the 
past minimally in order to preserve an old tradition.100 It can also, 
however, come about because of pragmatic reasons, connecting it to 
the central ideas of legal pragmatism. 
Recall that legal pragmatism places great emphasis on 
instrumental and contextual rulemaking. Translated to the 
adjudicatory process, this implies that the same emphasis ought to 
guide judges’ decisionmaking as well.101 Thus, any rule or decision 
ought to be driven by its consequences in society, measured by 
concrete (as opposed to abstract) attributes. Assessing the 
consequences of a decision or rule requires an empirical prediction, 
and the further removed the rule becomes from the case at hand, the 
greater the predictive uncertainty associated with its future 
consequences.102 Given pragmatism’s emphasis on the consequences of 
a decision, it tends to caution against broad rulings with uncertain 
consequences.  
Decisional narrowness derives from pragmatism’s insistence 
that consequences inform decisions.103 In the face of uncertainty over 
future consequences, it advocates a sense of caution. This corresponds 
to what some scholars describe as the “implicit behavioral rationality” 
of the common law—the common law’s recognition that actors 
(including judges) are boundedly rational agents, and its consequent 
deployment of corrective mechanisms and devices to compensate for 
this boundedness.104 Since judges cannot predict the consequences of 
their rulings for all time, they adopt narrow rulings where 
 
 100. See Holmes supra note 25, at 469 (noting the irrationality of such an approach and 
observing famously that “[i]t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it 
was laid down in the time of Henry IV”). 
 101. See Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 5 (1996) 
(describing how pragmatic judges make decisions prioritizing present and future needs). 
 102. For a recognition of this point, see RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 246–47 
(2008) (observing how pragmatic judges are likely to favor narrow rather than broad rulings, in 
the early evolution of a legal doctrine). 
 103. See id. at 246 (explaining how economic cost-benefit analysis fairly describes how judges 
weigh consequences). 
 104. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 
235 (2006); see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in 
Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 574 (1998) (describing steps courts take to correct for the 
human propensity to view past events with a hindsight bias); Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior 
and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205, 215–17 (2001) (citing the workplace as an area in which 
the common law can help correct for inefficient and unfair behavioral incentives, such as 
employers discharging late-career employees earlier than they implicitly contracted). 
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consequences are easier to predict based on information available to 
them.105 
Legal pragmatism’s insistence on contextualizing rule- and 
decisionmaking also favors narrow rulings. In the abstract, 
instrumentalism and contextualization may seem to conflict.106 
Contextualization emphasizes the centrality of custom and social 
practices, as well as socially situated rulemaking.107 In the common 
law, any rule originates not from a pre-commitment to a set of values, 
but rather from the facts of the case at hand. Justice Holmes, the 
quintessential common law pragmatist, thus observed that it was “the 
merit of the common law that it decides the case first and determines 
the principle afterwards.”108 Focusing on the case at hand results in 
narrow rulings. On the whole, common law pragmatism thus favors an 
incremental approach to rulemaking.  
To sum up, pragmatic incrementalism builds on the values of 
instrumentalism, antifoundationalism, and contextualization that it 
draws from legal pragmatism. As a theory of common law 
decisionmaking, it also favors decisional narrowness or 
incrementalism. These values in turn translate into four characteristic 
practical attributes when applied to common law decisionmaking, 
which the next Section elaborates on, in the process identifying 
strategies and techniques that courts use to instantiate them in the 
context of common law intellectual property. 
To be sure, sometimes common law courts do deviate from 
several of these techniques and ideas. Nevertheless, they are central 
to common law intellectual property decisionmaking. Courts act 
cautiously, construct their rules and principles in value-neutral terms, 
customize law and lawmaking, and strive to balance ex ante and ex 
post considerations. The rest of this Part examines these four 
principles in detail. 
 
 105. See SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE, supra note 98, at 53 (arguing that minimalism is a sensible 
reaction to judges’ inability to predict all consequences). 
 106. For a description of this point, see Thomas C. Grey, Freestanding Legal Pragmatism, 18 
CARDOZO L. REV. 21, 24 (1996) (explaining that instrumentalism and contextualization developed 
as independent, often opposing schools of thought).  
 107. See Grey, supra note 97, at 798–800 (discussing how pragmatists believe that 
knowledge derives from habit and practice, highly rooted in the social context). For strands of 
this idea in philosophical pragmatism, see CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, What Pragmatism Is, in 5 
COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE para. 416 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss 
eds., 1934). 
 108. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Codes and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REV. 1, 1 
(1870). 
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A. Caution in the Face of Uncertainty 
The first practical attribute of pragmatic incrementalism is 
courts’ concern with errors. In dealing with an activity that is prone to 
change, courts often try to cabin the scope of their decisions, thereby 
enhancing the law’s ability to address future developments with fewer 
constraints when needed. Some term this as the concern with “error 
costs”—the concern that either a high number of small mistakes or a 
small number of large mistakes will seriously harm the legal system 
and society.109 This concern with mistakes that are likely to flow from 
the inadequacy of information about a law’s consequences results in 
courts exercising a good degree of caution in their development of the 
law. 
Caution of this nature is particularly common in situations 
where the consequences of a rule remain uncertain. Again, this 
derives from pragmatism’s insistence that decision- and rulemaking 
pay close attention to their context and consequences.110 Caution may 
be seen during the early stages of a rule’s development, when its 
impact remains altogether unknown.111 Sometimes, however, it may 
also bear no connection to the stage of doctrinal development in an 
area. This is seen most prominently in areas that remain inherently 
susceptible to change, due either to technological developments or 
other sociocultural factors. Cass Sunstein, for instance, argues that 
the Supreme Court’s opinions dealing with the application of the First 
Amendment to new communications technologies are characterized by 
a significant amount of caution.112  
Another good example of the common law’s emphasis on 
caution is stare decisis’s useful differentiation between the holding 
and dicta of a case.113 The traditional principle emphasizes that it is 
only a court’s holding in a case that binds a future court, with a 
holding understood as the court’s application of the rule it formulates 
 
 109. See SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE, supra note 98, at 49–50 (describing “error costs” as the costs 
of mistaken judgments, and arguing that a minimalist approach is sometimes the best way to 
minimize them); see also Cass R. Sunstein & Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second-Order Decisions, 
110 ETHICS 5, 26 (1999) (discussing the potential societal harm that can arise when broad 
decisions are made by judges who cannot predict every conceivable consequence). 
 110. See infra text accompanying notes 194–208. 
 111. See POSNER, supra note 102, at 246 (describing how pragmatic judges may favor narrow 
decisionmaking early in a legal doctrine’s development, so as not to step beyond the level of 
consequential information the case provides). 
 112. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE, supra note 98, at 181. 
 113. See generally Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
953, 956–58, 1065 (2005) (describing the distinction in some detail and the lack of scholarly 
attention to it). 
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to the facts of the dispute before it. Extensions or variations of the rule 
that the court doesn’t itself apply to the case are loosely classified as 
dicta and not binding on future courts.114 To be sure, the distinction is 
not watertight, and courts certainly never adhere to it with any 
rigidity. Yet, it originated in the common law’s desire to force courts to 
limit their formulations to the case at hand, leaving later courts free 
to modify earlier precedents as circumstances demand. 
In developing common law intellectual property, courts have 
long proceeded cautiously for two reasons. First is the uncertainty 
accompanying the area of information production. Common law courts 
lack expertise on the nuances of the industry under consideration, 
especially when it involves new technologies and when future 
developments remain unclear.115 Second is the uncertainty about the 
costs and benefits of free riding. It might be beneficial to allow some 
free riding under limited circumstances, and broad property-like 
exclusionary regimes may have a chilling effect on certain kinds of 
socially beneficial activities.116  
A cautious approach leaves open the possibility that an 
exclusionary regime may prove to be unnecessary as an industry 
develops, or that strong public interest concerns may outweigh the 
need for protection.117 It also allows courts to take the law in new 
directions, should technology or other socioeconomic realities change 
dramatically. Recall that one of the issues with all forms of 
intellectual property protection is that it impacts not just outputs, but 
also inputs. Outputs protected under an exclusionary regime form 
 
 114. For an early elaboration on this distinction by Chief Justice Marshall, see Cohens v. 
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399–400 (1821); see also Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 
142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2000 (1994) (referring to dicta as “statements in a judicial opinion that 
are not necessary to support the decision reached by the court”). 
 115. For an analysis of the interaction between industry structure and legal entitlements, 
see Tim Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 123, 
124–26 (2006) (arguing that intellectual property assignments that affect product development 
decisionmaking can have a major influence on future economic performance). 
 116. Indeed, this was the basis of Judge Learned Hand’s and Justice Brandeis’s objections to 
common law intellectual property creation to begin with. See supra text accompanying note 6. 
 117. A case in point is the television industry in the United States, where broadcasters were 
long denied full-blown property protection over their content-carrying transmission signals 
(unlike in Europe, which recognized such protection). It resulted in the emergence of a robust 
cable television industry, and the idea of “free television” as an operational paradigm in the 
United States. See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Social Costs of Property Rights in 
Broadcast (and Cable) Signals, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1303, 1305–06 (2007) (discussing the 
difference between countries recognizing “broadcasters’ rights” and the United States); Timothy 
Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 319–24 (2004) (discussing the 
patchwork system of intellectual property protection regulating the cable industry in favor of 
broadcasters, and noting that the cable industry experienced major growth once regulation was 
relaxed in the mid 1970’s). 
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inputs into future production, often of the same kind that the regime 
is seeking to encourage.118 The magnitude and precise nature of this 
dynamic inefficiency is impossible to predict, and a cautious approach 
leaves courts free to drastically reduce their impact on the system by 
building the system up incrementally, eliminating such inefficiencies 
when they arise. Were courts to adopt an expansive, context-neutral 
approach to protecting common law intellectual property, they would 
be forced to retrench the system later on by carving out limitations 
and exceptions, thereby undermining any reliance placed on earlier 
rules.  
1. Relational Property 
The first cautionary technique involves moving away from the 
idea of property. Property rights ordinarily operate in rem, against the 
world at large, by providing their holders with an entitlement to 
exclude others from an identified resource. Such exclusion is necessary 
to make optimal use of scarce physical resources. Intangibles and 
informational resources, however, are by their very nature 
nonrivalrous, and simultaneous uses of them do not interfere with 
each other. A property right is therefore granted in them largely to 
function as an incentive for their very production. While such 
protection provides an incentive to produce, it also imposes costs on 
society as a whole by forbidding others from using the resource. In 
economic terms, these costs are often referred to as static and dynamic 
inefficiencies.119 Tailoring the property right (that is, the incentive) by 
limiting it balances these competing interests. 
Most common law intellectual property regimes try to do just 
this. Their conception of property is tailored to the peculiarities of the 
relationship between a specific class of plaintiffs and defendants.120 In 
other words, protection is not automatically available against the 
world at large, like it is for ordinary property or indeed traditional 
intellectual property.  
 
 118. See BENKLER, supra note 22, at 36–37 (describing how enforcing copyright protection 
causes information to be underutilized in the present, but hopes to increase information 
production over time). 
 119. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 15, at 12–13. 
 120. By “relationship,” I do not mean to emphasize that there needs to be a pre-existing 
relationship or connection between the parties, but rather that the triggering event for the 
entitlement originates in the interaction between them, regardless of whether it predates the 
cause of action or occurs simultaneously with it.  
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Take, for example, the Court’s decision in International News 
Service.121 Conscious of the problems with recognizing full-blown 
property protection for news (that is, information), the court 
emphasized that the property-like interest it was creating was a 
consequence of the competitive relationship between the two parties, 
an interest it labeled “quasi property” for precisely this reason.122 
Independent of such competition, the interest would cease to exist; 
competition is an element of the doctrine that state common law 
continues to emphasize to this day. What was the court really worried 
about in avoiding full-blown property protection for news? For one, 
monopoly control over information (as opposed to original expression) 
would have run up against free speech concerns by impeding the 
dissemination of information to (and among) the public.123 
Additionally, the majority opinion also limited itself to the newspaper 
industry as it existed then, seemingly aware of the possibility that the 
mechanisms of news transmission were likely to develop and change 
over time.124  
A similar emphasis on the relational nature of the entitlement 
is seen in the law of trade secrets, where Justice Holmes famously 
emphasized that the use of “property” to describe trade secrets should 
not detract from the reality that it always arises within the context of 
a specific relationship between two parties.125 The same is true of 
common law idea protection, where the protectable interest originates 
entirely in the implied relationship between a plaintiff-creator and a 
defendant.126 
 
 121. See supra text accompanying notes 64–70. For an analysis of the case in terms of 
restitutionary principles see Gordon, supra note 2, at 266–68 (arguing that fairness and 
economics would be served by restoring INS to its restitutionary principles). 
 122. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918). 
 123. See id. at 241 (noting that the aim was not to allow monopolization over information-
gathering and dissemination, but rather to secure partial temporary exclusion to prevent one 
competitor from reaping the fruits of another’s efforts). 
 124. See id. (observing how the “practical needs and requirements of the [news] business” 
were reflected in the complainant’s bylaws). Recent scholarly work has suggested that the news 
industry had been lobbying for property-like protection in the decades leading up to 
International News Service, efforts which failed at the legislative level. See Robert Brauneis, The 
Transformation of Originality in the Progressive-Era Debate over Copyright in News 2 (George 
Washington Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 403, 2009), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1365366. Brauneis also argues that at the time, the industry relied 
heavily on an informal system of information-exchange, which would change rapidly with the 
advent of the telegraph. See id. at 11, 15. 
 125. See E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917) (noting 
that the trade secret issue at hand originated in prior confidential relationship between the 
parties, rather than from property or due process). 
 126. See supra text accompanying notes 58–60. 
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2. Discretionary Subject-Matter Filters 
Not all forms of common law intellectual property emphasize 
the relationship between plaintiff and defendant. Some continue to 
operate as traditional in rem property interests.127 Yet here too, courts 
limit the scope of the right by reference to the peculiarities of the 
informational resource at issue. Very often, such limits supplement 
relational limits. Limiting by subject matter entails the use of filtering 
devices to circumscribe the eligibility of an intangible for protection 
independent of the defendant’s own actions. Subject matter limits are 
well known in statutory patent and copyright. Common law 
intellectual property regimes have their own set devices, limiting 
eligibility for protection by context.  
These subject matter limits give common law courts great 
flexibility. They afford common law courts broad discretion to mold 
them to new contexts and to give effect to diverse values that justify 
the grant or denial of protection. This discretion allows courts to limit 
the reach of a regime through both substantive and structural 
methods. The former involves interpreting the limit to exclude 
something from protection, while the latter entails cabining or 
limiting precedent narrowly to the facts in issue. To be sure, both 
methods are also available to courts in the statutory intellectual 
property context, but the presence of statutory language, often 
defining or guiding the application of the limit, constrains courts’ 
ability to limit precedent. 
The requirement of “concreteness” is a particularly good 
example of a subject matter filter designed to foster judicial discretion. 
Common law idea protection insists that an idea be “concrete” for it to 
be eligible for protection.128 Yet, courts have struggled to make sense 
of concreteness. The substantive method of employing the filter can 
take two forms: one approach takes concreteness to mean that the 
idea must be reduced to a tangible form,129 presumably to serve an 
 
 127. Publicity rights and common law copyright are perhaps good examples. 
 128. See Hamilton Nat’l Bank v. Belt, 210 F.2d 706, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (noting that “the 
law shies away from according protection to vagueness”). 
 129. See, e.g., Shanco Int’l Ltd. V. Digital Controls, Inc., 312 S.E.2d 150, 153–54 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1983) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s wrongful appropriation claim in part because his 
idea for a video game was not put in any concrete, usable form, such as plans, blueprints, or 
diagrams); Bailey v. Haberle Congress Brewing Co., 85 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52 (Syracuse Mun. Ct. 1948) 
(dismissing a breach of contract to pay for an advertising slogan claim for reasons including that 
even if the defendant obtained the idea from the plaintiff, ideas that are not embodied in 
concrete form are not protected absent express contract); Tutelman v. Stokowski, 44 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 47, 48 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1939) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim that he had a property right in 
his idea for producing animated cartoons to run synchronously with well-known musical 
compositions in a motion picture for reasons including that an idea must be put into a concrete 
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evidentiary role, while another interprets it to imply merely that the 
idea be detailed and developed, in order to avoid the problem of 
overbreadth.130 Judicial opinions have gone back and forth—affirming 
both theories for the doctrine.131 Additionally, courts have used the 
common law origins of the concreteness filter to limit extensions of the 
law to new situations even when other courts haven’t found the need 
to through the common law process—the structural method of 
employing the filter. Thus, while one court has denied protection to 
the slogan “Neighborly Haberle” on the ground that it was not 
concrete, another allowed protection for the slogan “A Macy Christmas 
and A Happy New Year.”132 The latter court distinguished the former 
case by noting how the slogan there was a part of a “full and 
complete,” “carefully phrased” advertising plan, effectively limiting 
the earlier holding to its unique facts.133 In another case involving 
cigarette advertisements, a court distinguished an earlier decision 
that had extended protection to a similar idea by express reference to 
the common law nature of the limit. It observed that each case had to 
be limited to its own facts and that the concreteness limit was 
“incapable of exact determination.”134 Scholars have criticized these 
opinions for their seemingly inconsistent application of the standard 
in near-identical scenarios.135 Yet from a structural point of view, they 
represent the effective use of the concreteness filter as a discretionary 
 
form of expression, which entails incorporating it into a product, which then becomes property, in 
order to be protected). 
 130. See, e.g., Jones v. Ulrich, 95 N.E.2d 113, 120 (Ill. App. Ct. 1950) (reversing the trial 
court’s dismissal while noting that “[a]lthough the idea to be protected must be concrete to a 
degree, there appears no requirement that it must be tangible and in a material form to entitle it 
to the protection of a court of equity”); Flemming v. Ronson Corp., 258 A.2d 153, 156 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Law Div. 1969) (finding that the plaintiff’s idea for a type of artificial candle, though not yet 
expressed in physical form, was still “concrete and usable,” but dismissing the claim on other 
grounds). 
 131. See Miller, supra note 61, at 726 n.94 (noting the “uncertainty over the philosophical 
basis for the concreteness requirement,” and how it has led to inconsistent case law). 
 132. Compare Bailey, 85 N.Y.S.2d at 54, with Healey v. R.H. Macy & Co., 297 N.Y.S. 165 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1937) (per curiam) (reinstating jury verdict in favor of plaintiff), aff’d, 14 N.E.2d 
388 (N.Y. 1938). 
 133. See Bailey, 85 N.Y.S.2d at 53 (distinguishing Healey on the grounds that in that case 
“plaintiff submitted to defendant not merely a slogan, but a full and complete advertising plan in 
writing, featuring the slogan, with drawings and sketches, and 200 words of carefully phrased 
advertising material”). 
 134. Compare Thomas v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 38 A.2d 61, 63–64 (Pa. 1944) (affirming 
judgment for defendant tobacco company because plaintiff’s idea was not novel and concrete, 
noting that “[e]ach case of this nature must of necessity depend upon its own facts”), with Liggett 
& Meyer Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, 194 N.E. 206, 210 (Ind. Ct. App. 1935) (affirming on grounds 
including that plaintiff’s idea for a billboard cigarette advertisement was concrete enough to go 
to a jury). 
 135. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 58, § 19D.06[A][1]; Miller, supra note 61, at 726 n.94. 
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limit on extending protection to a domain where the consequences of 
such an extension remain unclear. The emphasis placed on the specific 
facts of a case to assess the concreteness of an idea is perhaps 
indicative of courts approaching the task of protecting ideas through a 
cautious assessment of the likely consequences. 
B. Semantic Value Pluralism 
Another distinguishing feature of the common law method is 
its use of concepts and terms that are couched at a relatively high 
level of abstraction. Rather than committing themselves to a 
particular set of values or goals for the law, this enables courts to look 
at conflicting values and balance them through a form of practical 
reasoning.136 The conceptual apparatus of the common law thus 
remains largely value neutral.137 
Tort law is a strikingly good example of this. Tort theorist Leon 
Green described this best when he noted that common law tort 
concepts are “exceedingly flexible, capable of accommodating many 
shades of meaning,” representing “not a language of precision but 
rather one of ambiguity . . . always requiring the judgment of some 
one [sic] to make it explicit.”138 Common law concepts thus derive their 
content from the way courts and litigants invoke them and instantiate 
them with particular meaning, as necessitated by the context.139 The 
concepts are therefore, on their own, capable of accommodating 
multiple values—in the process allowing them to coexist within the 
broader parameters of the system. Value pluralism derives entirely 
from legal pragmatism’s antifoundational ideal.140  
 
 136. For a succinct discussion of why judges rely on practical reasoning, see Joseph William 
Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 899, 944–48 (2009). 
 137. See Mario J. Rizzo, Rules Versus Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Common Law, 4 CATO J. 
865, 865 (1985) (“The common law . . . can restrict itself to the provision of abstract rules that 
enhance the possibilities of an order in which individuals can pursue and attain their own 
goals.”); cf. Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A 
Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 300 (2007) 
(observing that even when decisions are rendered using concepts that have deontic significance, 
they allow for consequentialist explanations as a consequence of the specialized meaning they 
have come to acquire over time—a process referred to as the “contextualist convergence”). 
 138. Leon Green, The Thrust of Tort Law, Part II: Judicial Law Making, 64 W. VA. L. REV. 
115, 129 (1962). 
 139. Coleman refers to this as the process of “inferential role semantics.” JULES L. COLEMAN, 
THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 7 (2001); see also Kraus, supra note 137, at 313–14 (explaining how 
Coleman rejects the notion that semantic elements have a determinate meaning in favor of the 
view that concepts are understood relationally). 
 140. For a discussion of legal pragmatism’s antifoundational approach, see supra Part II.A. 
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Though scholars have analyzed common law intellectual 
property regimes in terms of foundational theories, the rules of the 
regimes themselves continue to consciously disavow exclusive reliance 
on any one theory. Much like the rest of the common law, they have 
continued to develop in semantically neutral terms, enabling a 
contextual balancing and application of foundational values. This is 
far less true of statutory intellectual property.141 Common law 
intellectual property’s value pluralism occurs at two different levels. 
Systemically, the regimes straddle multiple doctrinal areas including 
tort, property, contract, and unjust enrichment. They draw devices 
and ideas from each of them, to produce a hybrid regime that 
resembles them all, but in parts. On a more granular level, they use 
doctrinal concepts and devices that are inherently open to contestation 
in terms of foundational value. 
1. Interdoctrinalism 
Common law intellectual property regimes resist categorization 
into any single area of the common law. To begin with, they do not 
treat the idea of property as an in rem right that is agnostic to the 
context and circumstances where it is enforced.142 They also borrow 
ideas and devices from tort, contract, and unjust enrichment to 
produce a hybrid regime that emphasizes different aspects at different 
times. Precisely what end does this serve though? First, it allows a 
regime to integrate multiple goals and values into its functioning. For 
instance, by relying on tort law ideas, which emphasize the 
wrongfulness of a defendant’s actions, it incorporates the ideal of 
corrective justice into its framework.143 Similarly, by using party 
consent as a device from contract law, it values autonomy. Second, as 
a direct consequence of this integration, it allows each individual 
 
 141. Even if statutory regimes do use concepts and ideas that are value-neutral on their face, 
they most often undergo a process of “contextualist convergence,” where as a consequence of 
courts’ use of ideas and concepts with a certain meaning/purpose in mind, the concept itself 
comes to acquire distinct meaning associated exclusively with the meaning/purpose in question. 
See Kraus, supra note 137, at 349. Copyright’s fair use doctrine is an excellent example of this 
phenomenon, where courts have over the years come to understand the doctrine almost entirely 
in market failure (or transaction cost related) terms. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, The End of 
Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the “Newtonian” World of On-line Commerce, 12 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 130–34 (1997). 
 142. For a discussion of how intellectual property’s nonrivalrous nature necessitates a 
relational property view, see supra Part II.A.1. 
 143. See Jules Coleman & Gabe Mendlow, The Normative Structure of Tort Law (forthcoming 
2011), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/academics/institutes/ilp/2009papers/Coleman 
PennWorkshopDraft.pdf (arguing that the normative structure of tort law affirms the ideal of 
corrective justice even if the institution’s foundational ideals may be more diverse),  
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regime to resist affirming the values associated with any single area of 
the law. For instance, if a regime rested entirely on contract law, 
courts would be hard-pressed to accommodate corrective justice and 
other values to which contract law remains largely inattentive.144 
Scholars have long criticized courts for their eclectic approach 
to rulemaking in the area of common law intellectual property. This is 
perhaps most noticeable in the area of trade secrets, where the 
inability to cabin the area into a single theory has even resulted in 
some questioning its utility as an independent area of intellectual 
property and recommending its replacement with individual common 
law doctrines.145 While a unified theory for trade secrets may enhance 
its coherence and logical consistency, it is by no means clear that this 
lack of coherence has proven to be a practical problem.146 
Trade secret law is perhaps the best example of 
interdoctrinalism. It draws on devices from property, contract, tort, 
and unjust enrichment. In the process, it endorses multiple values: 
incentives, allocative efficiency, autonomy, commercial morality, 
corrective justice, and other distributive goals.147 Publicity rights also 
reflect this feature, albeit to a lesser degree. While these rights are 
today thought to be truly proprietary, given earlier understandings of 
the area as deriving from tort and contract law, courts and scholars 
continue to disagree about the area’s underlying theoretical 
justification. As a result, multiple theories, each with a very different 
 
 144. See generally Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 
763, 797 (1983) (exploring justifications for paternalism in contract law and criticizing it for 
being inattentive to the unique motives of contracting individuals); Anthony T. Kronman, 
Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 474 (1979) (arguing that contract law 
should be used to promote distributive justice when alternative means are less acceptable). 
 145. See Bone, supra note 36, at 246–47 (arguing that trade secret law should not extend 
beyond the limits of individual common law areas such as contracts or torts, describing it as ”not 
essential to the protection of intellectual property”). 
 146. The focus of Bone’s analysis remains almost entirely on problems with individual 
“general” theories often proposed to justify the entire body of trade secret law. In practice, trade 
secret law seems to be far less problematic, other than facing problems in justifying its own 
existence on the basis of any single theory. Yet Bone’s argument can be understood to make the 
case more convincingly for an antifoundationalist approach to trade secret law—one that 
recognizes the multiplicity and incompatibility of its numerous values. See id. at 304 (arguing 
that we should “recognize trade secret law for what it is: a collection of contract and tort theories 
grouped together by the nature of the subject matter they regulate”). 
 147. See KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON 
LAW 3–4 (1988) (underscoring concerns for democracy and efficiency); see also James W. Hill, 
Trade Secrets, Unjust Enrichment, and the Classification of Obligations, 4 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2, 2 
(1999) (noting that courts sometimes view liability under trade secret law as attempting to 
“enforce morality in business”); Lemley, supra note 34, at 319–28 (explaining trade secret law 
through tort, contract, property, and commercial morality). 
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emphasis, coexist.148 Prominent theories for the continued existence of 
publicity rights include those focused on economic incentives, natural 
rights, efficient allocation, and autonomy, and those seeking to 
suppress commercial misrepresentation.149 Again, much like trade 
secret law, theoretical diversity flourishes because these rights 
operate at the intersection of multiple doctrinal areas and draw from 
them for concepts and ideas.  
2. Contestability  
Contestability is a philosophical idea that refers to a situation 
of disagreement about the normative content of a particular 
concept.150 While some understand contestability to be a feature of 
vagueness, others attribute it to theoretical or ideological 
disagreement.151 Beyond mere contestability though, certain concepts 
are thought to be “essentially contested” in nature, a term first coined 
by the philosopher W.B. Gallie.152 A concept is “essentially contested” 
when contestability (or normative disagreement over its content) is 
central to its meaning and existence. In other words, contestability is 
a fundamental purpose of these concepts, rendering it essential to 
their enterprise.153 Examples include concepts such as art, democracy, 
freedom, and sovereignty.  
Where normative disagreement is central to an area or 
recognized to be intractable, essentially contested concepts allow a 
discourse to focus participants’ attention on the contestation and its 
basis.154 Essential contestability thus emphasizes that the meanings of 
some concepts need to change over time, as circumstances change, and 
 
 148. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 1:1-26; Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a 
Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383, 406 (1999) (noting the unsettled nature of the 
justification, legitimacy, scope, and content of the right of publicity). 
 149. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, §§ 2:1–2:9. 
 150. Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues, 82 CAL. 
L. REV. 509, 526 (1994).  
 151. See TIMOTHY A.O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW 47 (2000) (describing it as a form of 
vagueness but noting disagreement over this characterization). 
 152. W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 167, 171–72 
(1956). For a more recent extension of the idea, see Christine Swanton, On the “Essential 
Contestedness” of Political Concepts, 95 ETHICS 811 (1985) (reformulating the concept of essential 
contestedness). 
 153. Gallie, supra note 152, at 169 (“[C]oncepts the proper use of which inevitably involves 
endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users.”). 
 154. Waldron, supra note 150, at 530–33. 
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that predicting or prescribing this change in advance is likely to be 
impossible.155 
The connection between essential contestability and 
antifoundationalism should be obvious. Essentially contested concepts 
and ideas allow multiple values and normative goals to coexist under 
a common head and for their conflict to remain central to the very 
meaning of those concepts and ideas. One characteristic feature of the 
common law lies in its persistent use of standards (as opposed to 
rules) to frame its doctrinal content.156 Standards, as scholars have 
long argued, give courts greater discretion to adapt the law to new 
circumstances ex post, while offering actors just enough guidance to 
plan their actions ex ante.157 Additionally, when framed in terms that 
facilitate normative debate over their purpose and meaning, standards 
resemble essentially contested concepts.158  
Common law intellectual property regimes use several 
prominent concepts that are contestable in this sense. Indeed, the 
mere possibility of such contestability has encouraged courts to 
employ loose standards rather than tightly worded rules in their rule 
formulation. Consider, for example, trade secret law’s requirement 
that the plaintiff have taken “reasonable efforts” to preserve the 
secrecy of the information in question. When exactly is a measure 
“reasonable”?159 As expected, here we find a wide array of views, 
ranging from those that examine the cost-effectiveness of a plaintiff’s 
actions, to those that emphasize the signaling effects of a plaintiff’s 
measures to protect secrecy.160 Although courts interpret this 
 
 155. Gallie, supra note 152, at 172 (prescribing a condition of essential contestability to be 
that “[t]he accredited achievement must be of a kind that admits of considerable modification in 
light of changing circumstances; and such modification cannot be prescribed or predicted in 
advance”). 
 156. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1685, 1685–712 (1976) (addressing the challenge of deciding between rules and standards 
as the forms for legal directives); cf. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 174–87 
(1991) (describing the common law process in terms that correspond to its use of generalizable 
rules—resembling the idea of standards). 
 157. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 568–
70 (1992) (describing the debate in terms of ex ante and ex post approaches to lawmaking). 
 158. For a recent argument similarly contrasting rules and standards, see Seana Valentine 
Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 
1214 (2010) (delineating the merits of the superficial opacity of standards). 
 159. See Lemley, supra note 34, at 317 (noting how the use of the word “reasonable” 
contributes to the confusion). 
 160. See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(noting that the more the owner of a trade secret spends on protecting the secret, the more he 
demonstrates the value of the secret); E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 
1012, 1017 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding that businesses should take reasonable precautions to protect 
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requirement in terms of fairness, efficiency, and consent, none of these 
variables dominate the contestable idea of a “reasonable measure.”161  
In the common law of idea protection, the requirement that the 
idea be sufficiently “concrete” is a similar evaluative standard, where 
contestation and disagreement in its application continue to exist.162 
Here too, courts use a variety of factors to assess whether an idea is 
concrete enough to merit protection. No single test dominates; a 
diversity of views thrives.163 
C. The Influence of Custom 
Pragmatic incrementalism also insists that decisionmaking be 
“situated” or contextualized. Thus, it directs judges to look to the 
interaction between a legal rule and the social norms surrounding the 
type of activity at issue.164 As a result, custom and practice often have 
a significant influence on common law courts’ formulation of a rule.165 
 
their trade secrets, but need not erect an “impenetrable fortress”); J.T. Healy & Son, Inc. v. 
James A. Murphy & Son, Inc., 357 Mass. 728, 737–38 (1970) (reiterating that individuals who 
wish to keep trade secrets must take all proper and reasonable steps to ensure secrecy); see also 
1 JAGER, supra note 37, § 5:16 (examining the signaling effects of plaintiff’s efforts to protect 
secrecy); 1 MILGRIM, supra note 23, § 1:04 (documenting considerations that courts take into 
account to determine whether this requirement is satisfied). 
 161. See Bone, supra note 36, at 279 n.171, 281 (observing how the “reasonableness” 
standard is both open-ended and contributes to the “uncertainty” of trade secret law). 
 162. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 58, § 19D.06[A][1] (noting how the concept has been 
used in cases in a variety of senses and presenting the argument that it is vague and uncertain). 
 163. See, e.g., Hamilton Nat’l Bank v. Belt, 210 F.2d 706, 708–09 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (permitting 
a cause of action where an idea is original, concrete, useful, and disclosed in circumstances 
demonstrating that compensation is expected if the idea is accepted and used); Chandler v. 
Roach, 319 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1957); Stanley v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 221 P.2d 73, 83–84 (Cal. 1950) 
(approving of jury instructions that stated that a new, novel, and original abstract idea, reduced 
to concrete form, may be protected by an implied contract); Jones v. Ulrich, 95 N.E.2d 113, 120 
(Ill. 1950) (noting that although an idea must be concrete to a degree to enjoy protection, there is 
no requirement that it be tangible and in material form); Smith v. Recrion Corp., 541 P.2d 663, 
665 (Nev. 1975) (requiring that the idea be capable of immediate use); Bailey v. Haberle-
Congress Brewing Co., 85 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52 (Syracuse Mun. Ct. 1948) (holding that an abstract 
idea can only be protected as private property when embodied in a concrete form); see also Miller, 
supra note 61, at 723–26 (noting the problems with the concreteness element). 
 164. See Grey, supra note 106, at 41 (“Law is contextual: it is rooted in practice and custom, 
and takes its substance from existing patterns of human conduct and interaction.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 165. Indeed, for long the common law was thought of as no more than customary law. See 
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 125 (1925) (describing the 
conception of common law as judges throwing “off the wrappings to expose” the law); A.W.B. 
Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in 1 FOLK LAW: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF LEX NON SCRIPTA 119, 131 (Alison Dundes Rentelin & Alan Dundes eds., 1994) 
(explaining the traditional notion of the common law as custom). This certainly isn’t to imply 
that customs have little or no influence in the statutory context—just that their influence is 
likely to be much greater in relation to common law rule development. 
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Allowing custom to inform the scope of common law rules, 
though, isn’t altogether without costs. For one, it may deter certain 
kinds of innovative activity if its effect is entirely to expand the scope 
and reach of a liability regime.166 It may also favor one set of actors at 
the expense of others.167 Consequently, courts using custom tread 
somewhat cautiously and often rely on a custom only when presented 
with conclusive evidence of it being widespread and well accepted by a 
broad set of actors.  
Looking to customary practices and usages contextualizes the 
common law process.168 But what does such contextualization 
contribute to common law intellectual property besides converting it 
into a bottom-up process? First, it leads to domain-specific rules. By 
enabling a rule to develop by reference to a single domain and the 
ways in which actors organize themselves and interact therein, it 
allows for a very high level of situational tailoring. This in turn leads 
rules to vary from one context to another, thereby avoiding the use of 
a one-size-fits-all approach to rule development. Secondly, custom also 
reinforces a regime’s antifoundationalism. By using custom in lieu of 
various normative assessments, common law intellectual property 
regimes allow courts to avoid having to justify their normative 
decisions by reference to anything other than the specific, descriptive 
reality of generally acceptable behavior. 
1. Domain-Specific Tailoring 
Domain specificity is custom’s biggest contribution to common 
law intellectual property. In intellectual property, scholars have noted 
how the use of uniform rules brings with it large costs that are only 
realized in the future, and, by the time these costs are realized, 
minimizing them is problematic.169 This problem of “uniformity” is 
endemic to most statutory, top-down regulation. The common law 
process, by contrast, produces rules that originate in a bilateral 
setting, which forces courts to pay attention to the circumstances of 
 
 166. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH. L. REV. 285, 
304 (2008) (noting that common law rules in tort may deter liability). 
 167. See Eric Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1704 
(1996) (noting that costs and benefits of common law rules are likely not symmetrical and that 
repeat litigators will attempt to exploit the constraints on courts to maximize their own wealth). 
 168. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68 (equating the common law with 
customary law); Simpson, supra note 165, at 131 (explaining the traditional notion of the 
common law as custom). 
 169. See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual 
Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 852–56 (2006) (delineating the societal problems of uniform 
costs in the context of intellectual property). 
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the parties involved in the dispute. While some scholars argue that 
this forces courts to ignore broader issues,170 it undoubtedly also 
results in much greater attention to detail. The use of custom to 
develop legal rules is perhaps the most direct way of minimizing the 
costs of uniformity.171  
Additionally, the process of domain-specific tailoring enables 
participants to have a greater say in the process. If the common law 
method was thought to be antimajoritarian, its reliance on custom 
serves to alleviate that concern to a limited extent. Customary 
practices allow individuals (or participants) to organize themselves in 
ways that serve their collective interests, independent of the special-
interest lobbying that accompanies that process.172 Recent studies 
have shown that there exist multiple areas where largely 
homogeneous groups have developed rules and practices to govern 
their interactions and the sharing of informational resources that are 
central to their activities.173 The resulting equilibrium from these 
rules and practices remains by and large stable.174 However, when the 
equilibrium is disrupted, common law intellectual property regimes 
can restore the equilibrium by developing rules to replicate the 
functioning of the custom. In the process, common law intellectual 
 
 170. Schauer, Bad Law, supra note 20, at 884. 
 171. See Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The 
Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. 
L. REV. 1787, 1839–40 (2008) (noting how decentralized norms can serve to break intellectual 
property’s “one-size-fits-all straightjacket”). But see Jennifer Rothman, Custom, Comedy, and the 
Value of Dissent, 95 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 19, 20 (2009), http://www.virginialawreview.org 
/inbrief/2009/04/20/Rothman.pdf (arguing that a contrary outcome is more likely). 
 172. Indeed this was Friedrich Hayek’s basis for preferring common law to statutory law, 
since to him the common law was made up entirely of rules that originate in customary practices, 
what he called the evolution of a “spontaneous order.” 1 FRIEDRICH HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, 
AND LIBERTY: A NEW STATEMENT OF THE LIBERAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND POLITICAL 
ECONOMY: RULES AND ORDER 124, 124–25 (1973). See generally Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized 
Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996) (describing the evolution of norms in philosophical and game 
theoretic terms). 
 173. See, e.g., Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual Property 
Systems: The Case of French Chefs, 19 ORG. SCI. 187, 187 (2008) (identifying three implicit social 
norms that protect intellectual property of recipes); Jacob Loshin, Secrets Revealed: How 
Magicians Protect Intellectual Property Without Law, in LAW AND MAGIC: A COLLECTION OF 
ESSAYS 123, 134–38 (Christine A. Corcos ed., 2010) (identifying the magic community’s norm-
based intellectual property regime, which limits access, establishes norms, and enforces 
violations); Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 171 (documenting the existence of such customs in the 
world of stand-up comedians). 
 174. Cf. Rochelle Dreyfuss, Fragile Equilibria, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF (2007), http://www. 
virginialawreview.org/inbrief.php?s=inbrief&p=2007/01/22/dreyfuss (suggesting some skepticism 
about the stability of the resulting equilibria). 
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property rules draw substantive content from the customary practices 
that they seek to replicate. 
International News Service illustrates this phenomenon. 
Richard Epstein has argued convincingly that the case is best 
understood against the backdrop of customary practices that existed 
among newspapers at the time.175 He observes how newspapers had 
an unwritten norm against copying news stories from each others’ 
bulletin boards and print editions, but allowed headlines to be copied, 
to be used as “tips” for further journalistic investigation.176 World War 
I interfered with the equilibrium that these norms had created.177 The 
Court’s opinion in International News Service was then doing little 
more than reinforcing a pre-existing custom, and its solution, heavily 
tailored towards time-sensitive news, corroborates this account. 
It is perhaps also against this backdrop of custom that one may 
understand Judge Learned Hand’s reluctance to extend common law 
misappropriation to the fashion industry shortly thereafter. Until the 
1940s, copying in the fashion industry between competitors was 
controlled rather effectively though a system of industry-wide norms 
created and enforced by the Fashion Originators’ Guild.178 In a well-
known decision around the same time, Judge Hand refused to extend 
misappropriation to copying in the fashion world, seemingly concerned 
with the issues of institutional competence and balancing.179 Could his 
reluctance be better explained by the existence of a strong system of 
norms that obviated the need for common law protection? Indeed, 
when the equilibrium disappeared as a consequence of the Guild being 
dissolved, Judge Hand seemed more willing to recognize some kind of 
protection for textile designs, this time under the rubric of traditional 
statutory copyright.180 Determining when a norms-based equilibrium 
 
 175. Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v. Associated Press: Custom and Law 
as Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 VA. L. REV. 85, 90–94 (1992). For critiques of Epstein’s 
analysis, see Stephen L. Carter, Custom, Adjudication, and Petrushevsky’s Watch: Some Notes 
from the Intellectual Property Front, 78 VA. L. REV. 129, 131 (1992) (cautioning against a court’s 
enforcement of private customs regarding property rights), and Lloyd L. Weinreb, Custom, Law, 
and Public Policy: The INS Case as an Example of Intellectual Property, 78 VA. L. REV. 141, 143 
(1992) (critiquing Epstein’s characterization of the dichotomy between positive and customary 
law and Epstein’s failure to adequately acknowledge the impact of spontaneous social order). 
 176. Epstein, supra note 175, at 95 n.24. 
 177. Id. at 105. 
 178. See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and 
Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1697 (2006) (noting how the Guild 
“was effective at policing design piracy among its members”). The Guild was set up in 1932 and 
eventually dismantled by 1941. Id. at 1697–98. 
 179. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929). 
 180. See Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 490 (2d Cir. 1960) 
(allowing copyright protection for a textile design). To be sure, other factors seem to have played 
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is in need of legal support is no easy task, since unnecessary 
interventions can have the effect of altogether undoing the normative 
significance of customary practices.181 Perhaps this is also the reason 
that various norms of information sharing and control continue to 
exist in different areas, largely untouched by any legal regime.182 
International News Service is a good example of a regime’s 
holistic domain specificity—situations where a common law regime 
develops entirely to benefit a single domain. In these situations, the 
normative content of the regime originates in customary practices, 
and the common law then gives these practices de jure significance by 
rendering them legally enforceable. Instances of holistic domain 
specificity are rare. 
Domain specificity can emerge from within a regime as well, 
when courts exhibit a willingness to interpret a legal standard 
differently for different groups of actors or resources. The use of 
custom here mirrors its role in other common law contexts such as 
products liability law or professional negligence.183 The rules of the 
regime originate in legal directives, but courts defer to ground 
realities in operationalizing the regime. Domain specificity internal to 
a regime, in other words, one that emerges from within a regime, is 
seen in trade secret law. To determine whether parties intended for 
information to be kept secret, courts look to prevalent practices in the 
industry. As is to be expected, these practices vary from one industry 
to another and from one type of informational resource to another. 
Courts are perfectly comfortable undertaking this granular inquiry on 
a case-by-case basis.184 Common law idea protection often relies on 
 
an important role as well, including a Supreme Court decision holding that the utilitarian nature 
of an object did not preclude copyright protection over its design. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 
218 (1954). Yet, Judge Hand’s change in position—and the motivations for the same—have been 
the subject of some scrutiny by scholars. See, e.g., Thomas Ehrlich, Copyright of Textile Designs—
Clarity and Confusion in the Second Circuit, 59 MICH. L. REV. 1043, 1043 (1961) (noting various 
points of confusion associated with Judge Hand’s decision in Peter Pan). 
 181. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms and the 
Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913, 1938 (1996) (noting that “when a norm is 
self-enforcing, judicial enforcement only provides opportunities for abuse without any off-setting 
benefits”). 
 182. See supra text accompanying note175. 
 183. See Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom 
in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1992) (exploring various standards of care used when 
assessing tort liability); see also Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: 
Malpractice Law at the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 164 (2000) (documenting the 
use of custom in medical malpractice cases and noting the general demise of deference to 
customary norms among physicians). 
 184. See, e.g., Flotec, Inc. v. S. Research, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1007 (S.D. Ind. 1998) 
(finding a “widespread but not uniform” custom of keeping a customer’s information confidential 
in the machine shop industry); Zemco Mfg. v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 759 N.E. 2d 239, 250 
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custom too. Here, to determine whether a recipient of a concrete and 
novel idea understood the submission to have taken place under a 
condition of confidentiality, courts frequently look to industry custom 
to determine the existence or absence of such an understanding.185 
Domain specificity thus involves deferring to participants in an 
area for guidance. It operates as a decentralization of the lawmaking 
process, allowing participants to organize themselves in the ways most 
conducive to them. As with any decentralized process, its effectiveness 
depends on the extent to which it is representative of the various 
interests involved. When the customary practices systematically 
undervalue the interests of less powerful participants—commonly 
seen in situations of greater heterogeneity among actors—the 
decentralization produces more problems than it does benefits.186 This 
is a common objection to the use of custom in the statutory intellectual 
property context.187 It remains less of an issue in the common law 
intellectual property context, where the bilateral nature of the dispute 
and the incremental process of rulemaking mitigate the potential 
 
(Ind. App. 2001) (disallowing a claim based on industry custom in the automobile parts 
industry); Machen, Inc. v. Aircraft Design, Inc., 828 P.2d 73, 78 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) 
(discussing the existence of an industry custom of confidentiality in the aviation industry); see 
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 41 cmt. b (2009) (“[T]he customs of the 
particular business or industry may be sufficient to indicate to the recipient that a particular 
disclosure is intended as confidential. The customary expectations surrounding the disclosure of 
information in noncommercial settings may differ from those arising in connection with 
disclosures in commercial contexts. The customary expectations regarding the confidentiality of 
information disclosed within the research facilities of an industrial firm, for example, may differ 
from those regarding disclosures in a nonprofit research laboratory.”). 
 185. See, e.g., Nadel v. Play-By-Play Toys & Novelties, Inc., 208 F.3d 368, 371 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(“To facilitate the exchange of ideas, the standard custom and practice in the toy industry calls 
for companies to treat the submission of an idea as confidential.”); Whitfield v. Lear, 751 F.2d 90, 
93 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding a custom in the television industry that when a studio is notified of a 
script, and reviews the script, it is customarily under an obligation to pay for the idea if it uses 
it); Victor G. Reiling Assocs. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 2d 175, 184 (D. Conn. 2006) 
(noting the existence of this norm in the toy industry, and attributing its importance to the need 
to protect individual inventors from exploitation by large toy companies); Minniear v. Tors, 266 
Cal. App. 2d 495, 505 (1968) (affirming the trial court’s finding of a similar custom in the 
television industry). 
 186. See Posner, supra note 167 at 1725. (noting that the few powerful members of a group 
may have more influence on the creation and enforcement of norms than the more numerous, 
less powerful members); Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual 
Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1981 (2007) (using intellectual property to state the broader 
proposition that custom may develop from rent-seeking, powerful participants). 
 187. See Rothman, supra note 186, at 1956–59 (critiquing the idealized view of customary 
practice that fails to acknowledge that powerful interest groups might control the creation and 
development of custom); Weinreb, supra note 175, at 145–47 (questioning the utility of certain 
statutory provisions of intellectual property law because society knows little about “general 
welfare” in the area of intellectual property). 
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under-representativeness of the process. In this sense, domain 
specificity contributes to the incrementalism of these regimes. 
2. Using the Positive as the Normative 
Using custom also facilitates common law intellectual 
property’s emphasis on antifoundationalism. By seeking to replicate 
the ways in which actors organize themselves to solve certain 
problems, courts avoid having to choose among conflicting values for 
an answer. It allows them to rely on a positive claim (about what 
parties do) to generate a normative answer (that parties ought to do 
that which they generally do). When presented with a conflict between 
efficiency, fairness, distributional concerns, and other moral ideas, 
custom allows courts to fall back on practical reasoning for a solution. 
This process isn’t without its own set of problems. Occasionally, 
courts use custom indirectly as a superficial proxy for a normative 
value, without actually analyzing how that value would operate in a 
given context. For instance, if a court were to conclude that a 
particular solution was the most efficient merely because it was 
customary in the industry or that the reason for choosing the custom 
was because it was the most efficient solution, the use of custom would 
have little normative significance of its own. It would operate as a 
dubious proxy for an independent efficiency analysis.188 Courts’ use of 
custom to this end can be contrasted with situations where they look 
to custom not as evidence for an independent variable, such as 
efficiency, but as the direct basis for a practical solution, rooted in the 
ways actors organize themselves. The crucial difference is that here 
they use the descriptive evidence of a custom as the very basis for 
their solution, while in the earlier set of cases they run their 
descriptive finding through the independent variable for which it is 
meant to be a proxy. The distinction is thus between direct and 
indirect uses of custom to derive a solution, with the latter being 
problematic.189 
 
 188. In recent work, one scholar points to the problems inherent in courts’ use of custom to 
answer these kinds of questions in intellectual property. Rothman, supra note 186, at 1931, 
1937. For a useful discussion of similar problems in the context of Internet norms, see Mark A. 
Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1257, 1286 (1998) 
(describing judges’ lack of technological sophistication and inflexibility as barriers to effective 
enforcement of norms). 
 189. Rothman classifies these uses of custom using terms such as “aspirational,” 
“nonnormative,” and the like. Rothman, supra note 186, at 1971, 1975. Yet, the direct/indirect 
classification may better capture the problem here. For instance, if a custom of employee 
confidentiality exists in an industry is that custom to be understood as aspirational or 
nonnormative? If by nonnormative one means no more than that it is evidence of something 
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Between the two processes just identified are also situations 
where the regime uses standards whose normative content is widely 
contested. The use of “reasonableness” as a standard in different 
contexts is a perfect example of this phenomenon.190 When courts use 
custom to assess the reasonableness of a solution, they certainly are 
not employing the custom directly. Yet, custom isn’t being used as a 
proxy for an independent evaluation either, since reasonableness is by 
its very nature devoid of uniform substantive content. Thus, when a 
common law intellectual property regime uses reasonableness as a 
variable, it provides courts with a stronger basis to analyze ways by 
which actors organize themselves and solve problems within an 
identified domain. While reasonableness could indeed come to be 
equated with efficiency, fairness, or some other substantive value,191 it 
remains equally susceptible to analysis in practical terms, thereby 
allowing courts to sidestep having to choose between competing 
conceptions. In this way, the use of custom serves to complement the 
idea of antifoundationalism. Trade secret law’s requirement of 
“reasonable measures of precaution” remains a perfect illustration of 
this phenomenon. In avoiding having to define “reasonable” in terms 
of efficiency, cost-effectiveness, or some other variable, courts look to 
actual practice within the relevant industry to assess the 
reasonableness of the plaintiff’s actions.192 
Custom thus allows common law intellectual property regimes 
to rely on current practices among actors in an area as the basis for 
their rule development. This doesn’t imply that the process merely 
reinforces the status quo by allowing little or no change over time. A 
 
other than its own existence—such as efficiency—then, it collapses back onto the direct/indirect 
distinction. 
 190. See id. at 1975 (noting how the use of custom here might be of some utility). 
 191. Indeed, problematic instances where courts use custom as a proxy for reasonableness 
are on closer analysis those where custom is used as a proxy for an independent value, i.e., 
situations where the addition of a reasonableness test does little more than obfuscate the inquiry 
and add a dimension of contestability when in reality none ought to exist. Courts’ use of custom 
in the fair use context, where the “fairness” of the use—rather than its reasonableness—is the 
mandated standard, illustrates this point. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 
471 U.S. 539, 550 (1985) (conflating the “reasonableness” of a use with its “fairness,” and thereby 
introducing a counterargument by The Nation that its use, while against custom, was not 
unreasonable); Rothman, supra note 186, at 1941 (discussing the differences between a 
reasonable use and a fair use in the context of intellectual property). 
 192. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985) (requiring that the 
information in question be “the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to 
maintain its secrecy”); see also Flotec, Inc. v. S. Research, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1000–07 (S.D. 
Ind. 1998) (finding that the requirement had not been met since the plaintiff had not followed 
the basic industry practice of indicating that the drawings in question were confidential); Elm 
City Cheese Co. v. Federico, 752 A.2d 1037, 1049–50 (Conn. 1999) (setting out commonly used 
methods of protecting secrecy in analyzing the requirement).  
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status quo approach of this sort would come about only if courts were 
to interpret the concept of “custom” differently from that of industry 
norms and practices.193 There seems to be little reason to believe that 
common law intellectual property regimes adopt such a narrow 
conception of custom.194 By contrast, courts seem well aware that 
customs are dynamic and as a consequence, look to how “widespread,” 
pervasive, or uniform a custom is, before modeling their rule on it.195 
D. Integrating the Ex Ante with the Ex Post 
Legal pragmatism insists that adjudication be “forward-
looking,” that it pay close attention to its social consequences, and that 
judges decide on the precise formulation of a rule based on evidence of 
these consequences.196 Yet, unlike lawmaking in the legislative or 
administrative context, common law rulemaking is constrained by the 
specifics of the dispute before a court. Common law courts therefore 
have to combine the instrumentalism of their rule formulation with 
the backward-looking nature of adjudication. 
This has two consequences. First, it causes courts to view the 
future through the present. By restricting their decisionmaking to the 
dispute at hand, it focuses any rulemaking that comes about through 
that process on circumstances analogous to those before them.197 
Second, it also forces courts to analyze the present through the 
perspective of the future. This involves judges adopting an ex ante 
perspective in their analysis of the dispute before them.198 When 
 
 193. See Richard A. Posner, Hayek, Law, and Cognition, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 147, 152 
(2005) (observing how “custom” may fail to keep up with changing economic or social practices).  
 194. See Posner, supra note 92, at 1657 (“[T]he law is forward-looking.”). 
 195. See, e.g., Flotec, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1007 (holding that a “widespread but not 
uniform practice” of keeping customer information confidential was not adequate grounds for 
infringement of trade secrets in the machine shop industry). 
 196. See Posner, supra note 92, at 1657 (“[The] law is forward-looking.”). 
 197. See Holmes, supra note 108, at 1 (“It is the merit of the common law that it decides the 
case first and determines the principle afterwards.”); Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 
Term: Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 89 (1987) (“In the process of personal 
reflection, however, the judge may stretch faculties for connection, while engaging in dialogue 
with the parties over their legal arguments and analogies.”); Schauer, Bad Law, supra note 20, 
at 883 (noting how lawmaking in the common law is contextualized through individual disputes); 
Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 417 
(1995) (observing how the appellate courts discharge their lawmaking function at times through 
issues needing such lawmaking being brought to their attention by litigants in individual cases). 
 198. For an overview of the ex ante approach to adjudication, see Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10–12 (1984), and Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Method, Result, and Authority: A Reply, 98 HARV. L. REV. 622, 622 (1985). My 
account of the ex ante perspective differs from Easterbrook’s formulation. His approach tends to 
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presented with a dispute, common law judges factor the effects of the 
law into their rule- and decisionmaking. Additionally, they do this not 
just for the future, but in their analysis of the past as well. In other 
words, they examine how a prior rule is likely to have impacted 
parties’ actions, resulting in the dispute before them. They use this 
then to understand the rule’s future consequences. Thus, the forward-
looking nature of the process isn’t only future-oriented. It also entails 
examining past precedents for their consequences manifested in the 
present.  
Courts developing common law intellectual property regimes 
often make a concerted effort to do more than just achieve justice 
between parties to a dispute. This is especially so when the regime 
relates to a rapidly changing area of activity. In these situations, 
courts focus on the future consequences of their decisions and the 
impact it is likely to have on actors in the area.  
Courts examine the consequences of common law intellectual 
property rules in three principal ways. The first involves analyzing the 
legal regime in question as a system that exists principally as a future 
inducement for certain kinds of behavior. This analysis is only mildly 
instrumental, since the incentive effects are attributed to the regime 
in the aggregate and not to individualized decisions that courts 
themselves make in applying the regime. The idea of incentives is 
offered here at the theoretical, rather than practical, level.199 Common 
law intellectual property regimes routinely employ the idea of 
incentives to this end, as do other areas of intellectual property.200 
A second method of analyzing a regime’s consequences involves 
examining how individual decisions and their holdings might impact 
actors in a certain area. This analysis differs from a focus on the 
system’s aggregate effects in that the consequences it looks to are 
short-term, and largely immediate in nature. Courts’ analysis of the 
“reasonable measure of secrecy” rule in trade secret law is a good 
 
correspond roughly to Posner’s concept of forward-looking decisionmaking, rather than involving 
an analysis of the actual dispute in terms of the ex ante effects of past precedents. 
 199. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 1569, 1577 (2009) (noting the extensive use of incentives rhetoric in current copyright law). 
 200. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (observing 
how the right of publicity provides an “economic incentive” to invest in a performance); Kewanee 
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484–85 (1974) (observing how trade secret law will serve to 
“encourage invention” in areas); U.S. Golf Ass’n v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-Max, Inc., 749 F.2d 
1028, 1035 (3d Cir. 1984) (describing the misappropriation doctrine as providing creators of 
intellectual property with “necessary incentives”). For scholarly arguments in a similar vein, see 
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 2:6 (discussing the incentive justification for publicity rights); 
Lemley, supra note 34, at 329–37 (arguing that trade secret law provides actors with an 
incentive to invent and disclose); Miller, supra note 61, at 711–15 (justifying common law idea 
protection in terms of the incentives it provides creators of ideas). 
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example. In determining whether a plaintiff took reasonable measures 
to protect the information in question, courts are often very cautious 
about placing the burden of secrecy too high, worried that doing so 
would result in an inefficiently excessive investment in secrecy 
measures.201 The consequence that their decision cares about is the 
investment in secrecy, which is different from the aggregate effect of 
the regime: the inducement to invest in innovative activity that 
generates valuable information.202 This form of analysis is moderately 
instrumental in the pragmatic sense, since its short-term focus could 
detract from the system’s long-term consequences. 
The third and perhaps most meaningful focus on consequences 
entails courts aligning the immediate effects of their decisions with 
the intended long-term effects of the regime as a whole. This involves 
two steps. In the first, courts accept the idea that a regime is directed 
at influencing primary behavior of a certain kindin the aggregate 
and over time. In the second, they examine: (1) the extent to which the 
parties’ actions were aligned with the effects that the system intended, 
and (2) how their own decision in the case is likely to contribute to or 
detract from the system’s incentive effects. In a negligence case, it 
would thus entail courts first recognizing that the law is directed at 
inducing actors to invest in efficient precautions. Then, in deciding an 
individual case, courts would examine whether parties were actually 
influenced to invest in such precautions and how their decision would 
contribute towards parties making such investments in the future.203 
While common law courts rarely go through these steps in practice 
while adjudicating tort, contract, or property claims, they frequently 
undertake just such an analysis in common law intellectual property. 
This form of analysis is most strongly instrumental in the pragmatic 
sense. 
The clearest example of this approach is seen in the law of 
misappropriation, as formulated by the Second Circuit.204 One of the 
 
 201. See, e.g., Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 725 (7th Cir. 
2003) (observing how the requirement depends on a balancing of costs and benefits); E.I. duPont 
deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016–17 (5th Cir. 1970) (noting how requiring 
the defendant to do more than it had would “impose an enormous expense” and that the court did 
not want to “burden industrial inventors with such a duty”). 
 202. Cf. Lemley, supra note 34, at 342–44 (noting the centrality of secrecy to the incentive 
justification for trade secret law). 
 203. Some argue that courts do precisely this, under a theory of untaken precautions. See 
Mark F. Grady, Untaken Precautions, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 139 (1989) (“The key question that 
courts ask is what particular precautions the defendant could have taken but did not.”); see also 
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 246 (1987) 
(arguing the same under a theory of marginal cost-benefit analysis). 
 204. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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elements for a valid misappropriation claim, under the court’s 
formulation, is a showing that “the ability of other parties to free-ride 
on the efforts of the plaintiff or others would so reduce the incentive to 
produce the product or service that its existence or quality would be 
substantially threatened.”205 The formulation thus accepts that one of 
the regime’s objectives may indeed be to induce the production of a 
product or service. It then forces courts to analyze that systemic goal 
through the dispute being decided. Cumbersome as it may seem, 
courts seem to have found few problems in undertaking an analysis 
along these lines, recognizing that the analysis of a regime’s 
consequences ought to be of more than just of rhetorical 
significance.206  
Misappropriation law certainly isn’t the only place where we 
see this type of analysis. Publicity law is another. While the incentives 
argument is often used to justify publicity rights, courts have on 
occasion stopped to ask whether the invocation of publicity rights in 
the case before them would serve to further the incentive effects 
claimed by the system, and on that basis have either extended or 
limited the application of the regime.207 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major 
League Baseball Players Association illustrates this point.208 There, in 
balancing the plaintiff’s claims against the defendant’s free speech 
rights, the court examined whether denying the plaintiff’s claim would 
reduce the incentive effects commonly imputed to the regime and 
concluded that in cases where no performance was involved, the 
incentive effect was “strained” and “less compelling” and that granting 
the plaintiff protection might have a harmful “chilling effect” on future 
speech. On that basis, it denied the plaintiff protection.209 This 
example also illustrates that the consequences being considered often 
extend to those not just for the plaintiff, but also for the defendant. 
Other courts have adopted near identical analyses.210 
 
 205. Id. at 845. 
 206. See, e.g., U.S. Golf Ass’n v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-Max, Inc., 749 F.2d 1028, 1034–41 
(3d Cir. 1984) (denying a misappropriation claim based on a lack of “direct competition”); X17, 
Inc. v. Lavandeira, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1109 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (applying the multi-factor NBA 
analysis in a misappropriation case); Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Cal. 
2000) (same); Fred Wehrenberg Circuit of Theatres, Inc. v. Moviefone, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 
1050 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (same). 
 207. But see 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 2:6 (criticizing its use here on the argument that 
such an analysis is never undertaken in the patent and copyright contexts). 
 208. 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 209. Id. at 974.  
 210. See, e.g., C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 824 
(8th Cir. 2007) (using the framework of Cardtoons to analyze publicity rights pertaining to a 
fantasy baseball service); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 938 (6th Cir. 2003) (same, 
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The various techniques described above and their relation to 
pragmatic incrementalism’s main ideas are summarized by the 
following table. 
 
Pragmatic 
Incrementalist 
Tenets 
Common Law Intellectual Property 
Techniques/Strategies 
 
Antifoundationalism 
Interdoctrinalism 
Encouraging Contestability 
Normative Use of Positive Custom 
 
Instrumentalism 
 
Incentives Analysis 
 
Contextualization 
 
Relational Property 
Domain Specific Tailoring 
 
 
Incrementalism 
 
Relational Property 
Discretionary Filters 
 
III. LESSONS FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REFORM 
The functioning of pragmatic incrementalism in common law 
intellectual property holds several important lessons for intellectual 
property law reform efforts. It points to creative possibilities that 
intellectual property lawmaking ought to consider as genuine options, 
either in addition to or in lieu of features prevalent in the current 
system. Given the inadequacies of the current patent and copyright 
regimes, and the widely recognized impracticability of radical reform 
from within their current frameworks, looking to common law 
intellectual property might provide lawmakers with important 
structural and substantive possibilities to consider. This Part details 
some of them. 
A. Institutional Choice and Design 
Questions of institutional choice—of determining the 
appropriate distribution of lawmaking power between different 
 
pertaining to artwork of Tiger Woods); Frazier v. Boomsma, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1779 (D. Ariz. 
2007) (same, pertaining to publicity rights of soldiers who died in Iraq). 
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lawmaking institutions—have received surprisingly little attention in 
intellectual property.211 The practical reality that legislatures have 
taken the lead in determining the shape and content of the law 
influences the way in which most participants in the system approach 
the mechanics of legal change. When any interest group today 
contemplates changing the law, its primary target remains the 
legislative branch.212 Rarely are courts, whether at the federal or state 
level, considered appropriate stand-alone venues for intellectual 
property law reform. Perhaps more importantly, though, intellectual 
property reform efforts have increasingly come to spend very little 
time and effort on the question of when the judicial process might be a 
better avenue for legal change than the legislative one. Legislative 
reform remains the norm, while reform through courts is considered 
an exception, or, at best, a supplement. The working of common law 
intellectual property regimes, at the very least, suggests there may be 
areas within intellectual property where courts are as well equipped 
as (if not better than) legislatures at lawmaking. The remainder of 
this Section will discuss the choice between legislative certainty and 
common law flexibility, and the interaction between the two. 
Legislatures certainly have distinct advantages. As 
democratically elected institutions, they are well suited to represent 
the multiple interests involved in intellectual property law and to 
reach compromises when necessary. Their directives are often 
universal in application, decisive on the appropriate trade-off between 
competing values, and, above all else, certain—enabling actors to plan 
their actions accordingly. Additionally, legislatures are particularly 
well suited for collecting and gathering information from different 
participants in an area, without being restricted to the specific parties 
of a dispute. All the same, their working has its costs. For one, law 
reform through the legislative process takes time.213 Recognizing this, 
legislatures are commonly reluctant (in the intellectual property 
context) to make minor, incremental changes to the law on a sustained 
basis. Additionally, intellectual property law reform through 
legislatures is prone to special interest group pressures, often 
 
 211. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN 
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 5–6 (1997) (observing how issues of institutional choice 
receive very little systematic attention in the law generally). 
 212. This accounts for the innumerable amendments to both the patent and copyright 
statutes. See supra note 1. In recent times, this has certainly come to be supplemented by a very 
large number of amicus briefs filed in leading intellectual property cases. 
 213. See Green, supra note 138, at 121–22 (observing this phenomenon in the context of tort 
law and arguing that it favors judicial law-making in the area). 
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resulting in gridlocks and stalemates.214 Thus, while legislative 
rulemaking comes with a high level of certainty, it often compromises 
on flexibility, in an effort to avoid incurring the costs of the legislative 
process on a repeated basis. 
In contrast, common law courts create rules from the context of 
a specific dispute. The rulemaking is thus “situated” in the sense that 
it takes the dispute as representative of a larger phenomenon and 
extrapolates to the future from there.215 The doctrines of stare decisis 
and ratio decidendi serve to constrain the court’s freedom in 
significant ways, ensuring that the exercise of any delegated 
discretion is undertaken in a largely principled way. This process of 
decisionmaking, with its enabling and constraining features, forces 
courts to proceed tentatively, in small steps, but with a high degree of 
precision. Since the process of rulemaking is invariably ex post, to the 
individual actor the law remains uncertain until a decision is actually 
rendered. This uncertainty could in turn have its own distinct set of 
incentive-related costs, since it might interfere with the ability of 
actors to plan their future undertakings. The common law process 
thus comes with a very high degree of flexibility, but compromises on 
certainty. 
In a reform initiative, one of the first points of comparison 
must therefore be the relative costs and benefits of flexibility and 
certainty to the area or question under consideration. No doubt, the 
analysis will reveal that, for a large number of areas and questions in 
intellectual property, the need for certainty will dominate. Basic 
issues such as the very availability of protection, the duration of such 
protection, and the nature of the rights it grants its holderwould 
benefit more from a rule-based rather than a case-by-case approach. 
These are indeed questions for which the demands of certainty 
outweigh the advantages of flexibility, from a purely ex ante incentive 
point of view for both plaintiffs and defendants. It is perhaps for this 
reason that a large number of states have thought it necessary to 
codify some of these basic questions even within the domain of court-
created intellectual property.  
 
 214. Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900–
2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2234 (2000) (reviewing the “abundant evidence” of rent-seeking by 
special-interest groups in the realm of “IP legislation”); William F. Patry, Copyright and the 
Legislative Process: A Personal Perspective, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 139, 141 (1996) 
(describing the extreme lobbying efforts of interest groups in the copyright lawmaking process).  
 215. The most cogent exposition of the idea can be traced back to the work of Karl Llewellyn, 
who emphasized the importance of a strong “situation sense” among common law judges. To him, 
situation sense entailed identifying relevant features in a set of facts, appreciating their social 
significance and thereupon approaching the case as an instantiation of a broader phenomenon. 
See LLEWELLYN, supra note 25, at 268–85, 447–48. 
1b. Balganesh_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 11/19/2010  5:01 PM 
1594 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:6:1543 
On the other hand, the certainty that tends to accompany the 
legislative process remains heavily dependent on the availability of 
information. And indeed when such information is available, the 
legislative process is superior to the judicial process in gathering it, 
notwithstanding the routine use of amicus brief filings by third parties 
in intellectual property cases.216 There are however a large number of 
situations where such information is either unavailable, incapable of 
being measured, assessed, or compared, or is of questionable currency. 
Several factors may contribute to this, including the wide variety of 
parties’ actions and their consequences, changing technology and 
social norms, and conflicting normative views and values on an issue. 
To favor certainty in these situations is likely to result in the law 
being grossly underinclusive or insensitive to the diversity of 
incommensurable preferences in society, thereby undermining its 
legitimacy. The analysis of common law intellectual property reveals 
how flexibility in the law can produce uniformity in principle, without 
degenerating into ad hoc decisionmaking. As situations change from 
one context to another and over time, a flexible, context-sensitive 
approach allows a legal regime to expand as needed, without striving 
for ex ante prescience. 
Tort law, for instance, has remained a flexible common-law-
based body of law, in large part due to the extreme variations in facts 
that courts encounter. To systematize the law with anything but open-
ended principles would leave courts with very little room to adapt the 
law to new situations as they arise. One sees the same in common law 
intellectual property. Norms of “secrecy” or “confidentiality” and the 
methods employed tend to show extreme variability, eluding rule-
based regulation. 
The inadequacy of information because of a divergence in 
values is a less appreciated side of the same problem. When the 
underlying value framework for an area or its theoretical basis 
remains uncertain in society and among participants, the imposition 
of certainty there will produce artificial results or those contrary to 
the ones intended. For long, the regulation of cyberspace was thought 
to necessitate favoring flexibility over certainty for precisely this 
reason.217 In that context, scholars came to favor a common law, 
 
 216. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 19–20 (2004) (detailing the number of such amicus filings in 
intellectual property cases between 1980 and 2003). 
 217. See Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1744–45 (1995) (noting 
a gulf between the known interests and the potential interests at stake in cyberspace); Suzanna 
Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: Congress and the Common Law in Cyberspace, 55 VAND. L. REV. 
309, 316–17 (2002) (arguing for common law solutions, rather than federal regulation, for 
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incremental approach that allowed courts to experiment with rules on 
a tentative, case-by-case basis until the core values underlying 
internet participation became clear and the consequences of 
implementing them predictable. Scholars have advocated similar 
approaches to the First and Fourth Amendments as well, where 
disagreement over values is pervasive.218 An example of this 
phenomenon can be seen in the world of intellectual property too. 
Contrast in this respect, the competing availability of a free speech (in 
other words, First Amendment-related) defense in copyright law and 
the law of publicity rights. Copyright law, developed as a rule-based 
framework, continues to struggle with cases where a defendant 
presents a free speech argument, with courts having to fit their 
analysis into the terms of the fair use doctrine. The law of publicity, in 
contrast, developed in flexible common law terms, allowing courts to 
give free speech concerns far more salience. This has enabled courts to 
craft new exceptions and defenses, the most notable of which is the 
“newsworthiness” defense, largely unheard of in copyright 
jurisprudence. 
The flexibility-certainty trade-off in many ways tracks the 
rules versus standards debate in legal theory. Yet, it does more than 
that. It points to the fact that in certain domains flexibility may not 
just be necessary, but also beneficialby forcing a deeper and more 
sustained consideration of the issues at stake. Determining when 
flexibility is preferable to certainty in intellectual property and vice-
versa is, to be sure, no easy or formulaic task. Yet, it is not without a 
corpus to draw from either. And this is where looking to common law 
intellectual property and its use of a flexible approach in different 
domains could prove helpful. 
Perhaps more importantly, what often goes unnoticed is that 
flexible common law rulemaking need not be completely independent 
of legislative action dealing with areas of a regime where certainty is 
needed. It can remain interstitial and coexist with legislative 
enactments in an area. Copyright law’s fair use doctrine and 
substantial similarity requirement are good examples here. In these 
situations, for pragmatic incrementalism to function effectively, the 
 
cyberspace issues). But see Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: 
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 883–87 (2004) (arguing 
that when it comes to criminal law, the common law method shouldn’t be applied to cyberlaw). 
 218. See Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of 
Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1149, 1149–51 (1998) 
(making an analogous argument in the Fourth Amendment context); Daniel A. Farber & Philip 
P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1615–17 (1987) 
(making the argument in relation to the First Amendment). 
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legislature needs to “empower” courts, or be seen as delegating actual 
common law rulemaking power to them.219 Such empowering statutes 
would thus favor the use of standards, as opposed to rules. 
Additionally, in their framing of standards, they might choose to 
employ highly contestable concepts that are capable of accommodating 
multiple values when invoked (for example, “reasonableness”). 
While the functioning of common law intellectual property as 
described in this Article certainly does not make the case for the 
superiority of judicial lawmaking in the area, at the very least it 
points to the exaggeration of claims that courts are ill-equipped to 
answer these questions. Substantive reform efforts would thus do well 
to integrate a study of relative institutional strengths and weaknesses 
before moving forward, recognizing that there might indeed be 
domains where change is better served incrementally through the 
judicial process, or that a collaborative exercise between courts and 
legislatures (for example, the fair use doctrine) would prove more 
effective in the long run. In situations of uncertainty, when the lack of 
information or the conflict of basic values demands a cautionary, 
tentative approach on an issue, the law would do well in entrusting to 
courts to develop rules as they have in the regimes described 
previously. 
It is also worth emphasizing that the method of pragmatic 
incrementalism described herein does not automatically point in the 
direction of courts (federal or state) for its instantiation. 
Administrative agencies acting in their quasi-judicial or adjudicatory 
capacities might be equally well positioned to incorporate its core 
tenets and techniques. One might thus see the method working 
equally well in the context of a specialized intellectual property 
tribunal, where rules are generated from the context of the dispute, 
with a strong reliance on precedent and common law reasoning 
techniques. We must remember, however, that it is not just dispute-
based rulemaking that results in the process being pragmatic and 
incremental. Structural norms such as stare decisis, precedent, 
analogical reasoning, and the use of formalist common law concepts as 
instrumental place-holders remain equally central. Courts and the 
judicial process are structured to exhibit these characteristics 
naturally. To the extent that other bodies model themselves on courts 
in these respects, the method of pragmatic incrementalism is likely to 
 
 219. Cf. Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 428–34 (2008) (describing the phenomenon of 
delegating to courts). 
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work there too. It too, at a minimum, would point to bodies other than 
legislatures as sources of intellectual property law reform. 
B. Valuing Practical Reasoning 
Today, courts, scholars, policymakers, and the general public 
disagree about intellectual property’s basic purpose. What is the 
system trying to achieve? The search for a grand theory to justify the 
institution has eluded scholars and practitioners for decades, if not 
centuries.220 While the economic analysis of intellectual property today 
dominates the landscape, it isn’t without its own set of rather 
significant shortcomings.221  
The pragmatic incrementalism of common law intellectual 
property regimes tells us that we do not need to worry about choosing 
between these different values and goals for all times to come, and 
that a single system can accommodate them all. The emphasis that it 
places on practical reasoning as a mechanism of balancing different 
substantive values serves to minimize the effects of any trade-off or 
prioritization that is necessary. It also cautions against placing too 
much reliance on theoretical coherence as a precondition to 
institutional design. 
What is practical reasoning though? Practical reasoning 
involves an eclectic approach to problem solving and avoids deciding 
an issue deductively by reference to a unifying principle. As an idea, it 
is often traced back to Aristotle and the belief that determining what 
is right (and necessary) in a situation does not require a universal 
theory of what is right.222 Instead, people make decisions by choosing, 
comparing, and balancing multiple principles as they relate to the 
problem at hand.223 Practical reasoning thus rejects both legal 
formalism and legal foundationalism.224 It asks courts to focus on the 
dispute, and to use the reality of the controversy before them to think 
about the law that they are expounding on. It emphasizes the reality 
 
 220. See Sunder, supra note 19, at 259–60 (“[T]here are no ‘giant-sized’ intellectual property 
theories . . . .”). 
 221. For an overview of the problems in the copyright context, see Balganesh, supra note 
199, 1572–76. See also MADHAVI SUNDER, IP: YOUTUBE, MYSPACE, OUR CULTURE (forthcoming 
2010). 
 222. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VI, chs. 5–11 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962) 
(understanding this idea in terms of the concept of phronesis). 
 223. See Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and 
the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 536 (1992) (“[T]he judge could approach the case as an 
example of a broader situation, giving the particular facts of the case some weight but assessing 
them in regard to the broader implications of the case.”). 
 224. Id. at 539. 
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of the controversy rather than the specifics of the controversy, an 
important distinction. The latter would have judges adopt a narrow 
view of their task, related exclusively to doing justice between the 
parties, while the former would have courts fit the dispute into a 
broader category to understand the wider real-world implications of 
their individual adjudication.225 
The Court’s approach in International News very well 
illustrates the use of practical reasoning. When faced with the reality 
of free riding between competitors in the news industry, the Court was 
neither presented with, nor indeed sought, a single theory for its 
decision on quasi property. It consciously rejected the formalist 
concept of “property in news,” recognizing that it was doing something 
vastly different.226 At the same time, the Court did more than just 
balance the equities involved in the case for which a pure property 
interest in news would have been adequate. Instead, it tailored its rule 
to avoid running up against free speech and other public interest 
concerns.227 In the decades since the decision, scholars have struggled 
to articulate a grand theory to explain Justice Pitney’s reasoning in 
the case. They note that the opinion uses ideas from corrective justice, 
distributional fairness, unjust enrichment, and unfairness in 
competition, but fails to incorporate them all into a unified 
framework.228 Yet, this eclecticism is indeed laudable; it effectively 
 
 225. Llewellyn made much of this point in his description of the common law system of 
analysis. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 301 
(Transaction Publishers 2008) (1962) (“[T]he common law court deals not only with the 
particular decision, but with the rule which is to become a precedent and guide the future.”). The 
importance of the reality of the controversy in allowing courts to sense the consequences of their 
decisions has been noted by others on several occasions as well. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. 
v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (noting that the 
redressability component of standing helps ensure that legal questions are resolved “in a 
concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial 
action”); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 241–64 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring) (closely examining 
factual background of the disparity in voting representation across Tennessee counties). But see 
Frederick Schauer & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Trouble with Cases 15 (Va. Law & Econ. Res. 
Paper, No. 2009-09, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1446897 (detailing the problems 
of under-representativeness that this entails). 
 226. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234–35 (1918) (“We need spend no 
time, however, upon the general question of property in news matter at common law, or the 
application of the copyright act, since it seems to us the case must turn upon the question of 
unfair competition in business.”). 
 227. Id. at 236 (“Regarding the news, therefore, as but the material out of which both parties 
are seeking to make profits at the same time and in the same field, we hardly can fail to 
recognize that for this purpose, and as between them, it must be regarded as quasi property, 
irrespective of the rights of either as against the public.”). 
 228. See, e.g., Baird, supra note 2, at 411 (noting how the danger of the Court’s approach lay 
in its not being clear about the real interest being protected); Rudolf Callmann, He Who Reaps 
Where He Has Not Sown: Unjust Enrichment in the Law of Unfair Competition, 55 HARV. L. REV. 
1b. Balganesh_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 11/19/2010  5:01 PM 
2010] COMMON LAW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1599 
allowed multiple variables to play out in the areaall of which subsist 
today, with little negative impact on the robustness of the doctrine. 
Eclecticism and practical reasoning, however, should not be 
confused with an entirely ad hoc approach to decisionmaking.229 
Practical reasoning is not the same as unprincipled decisionmaking. 
Rather, it involves employing experience and expertise to disaggregate 
a complex situation and then reconstruct it based on categories and 
ideas that have arisen in the past. As some have argued, it involves 
more than just bare intuition and entails the process of “sophisticated 
pattern recognition.”230 Others have described its functioning in terms 
of hermeneutical theory.231  
As a process, practical reasoning entails embracing the 
pluralism of values and ideals underlying an area, but working 
through the complexity of the situation inductively through its 
context. Through the focus on context, the abstract inconsistency of 
multiple values comes to be overshadowed by their practical 
compatibility. In recent work, Joseph Singer argues that practical 
reasoning is the primary way that judges and lawyers, unlike 
theorists and philosophers, approach the task of decisionmaking.232 To 
Singer, the essence of practical reasoning lies in providing 
decisionmakers with a way to balance incommensurables. He 
identifies three ways by which this is achieved.233 The first involves 
the direct balancing of competing interests.234 A balancing approach is 
most suited to situations where the parties’ interests can be 
understood along a single variable that the decisionmaker determines 
is to be prioritized up front. A cost-benefit analysis, such as 
 
595, 597 (1942) (noting how the case relied on a theory of unjust enrichment for its decision); 
Gordon, supra note 2, at 266–67 (observing how the decision had two rationales, one deriving 
from fairness and the other from economic reasoning). 
 229. For this criticism of practical reasoning, see Martin H. Redish & Gary Lippman, 
Freedom of Expression and the Civic Republican Revival in Constitutional Theory: The Ominous 
Implications, 79 CAL. L. REV. 267, 290 n.132 (1991); Stephen D. Smith, The Pursuit of 
Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 434–37 (1990); David E. Van Zandt, An Alternative Theory of 
Practical Reason in Judicial Decisions, 65 TUL. L. REV. 775, 791 (1991). 
 230. Farber, supra note 223, at 555–56. 
 231. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical 
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 322 (1990) (applying practical reasoning to statutory 
interpretation); Farber & Frickey, supra note 218, at 1616 (applying practical reasoning to 
interpretation of the first amendment); Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical 
Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137 (1990) 
(applying practical reasoning to federal Indian law). 
 232. See Singer, supra note 136, at 944 (“Lawyers recognize that we have plural, 
incommensurable values and that we generally hold to a form of practical reason to decide hard 
cases in a practical manner.”). 
 233. Id. at 972–73. 
 234. Id. at 973–74. 
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intellectual property’s incentives-access trade-off would fit this 
category. The second involves the idea of “contractualism,” or the use 
of widely recognized ideas of rightness and wrongness to arrive at a 
decision and justify it.235 To Singer, in the legal context, this involves 
that process of “reversing roles”or trying to understand the decision 
in terms of the other side’s context, in other words, on the assumption 
that a party’s normative preferences aren’t capable of being 
determined.236 This ideal is then represented in the way that judges in 
the common law tradition often work hard to explain the reasoning 
behind their decisions, even when they don’t have to do so. 
The third mechanism that Singer identifies uses Rawls’s idea 
of the “reflective equilibrium.”237 The method of arriving at a reflective 
equilibrium entails moving back and forth between the general and 
the specific, and allowing modification and updating at both ends of 
that process. The decisionmaker deems the outcome acceptable when 
he achieves sufficient coherence through this back and forth. The back 
and forth process combines inductive, deductive, and analogical 
reasoning in the decisionmaking process. 
Applying Singer’s mechanisms to intellectual property 
lawmaking reveals several important lessons. To begin with, it would 
imply that the system need not prioritize certain values over others up 
front, but can instead hope to achieve a harmonious balance between 
them within the institution and over time. It involves recognizing the 
existence of multiple, equally viable, theoretical values for an 
institution, and then looking to how each is likely to work in the 
context of the case being decided. Judges test the implications of each 
value against the likely short- and long-term practical effects of their 
decision. In the process, they update their choice of value framework, 
modify its exclusivity, and perhaps even achieve a balance between 
multiple values in the context of a single decision. Central to the 
entire process is thus an abandonment of the idea that the rule-
development and decisionmaking processes necessitate abstract 
theoretical coherence, and a recognition that the needs of deciding the 
case at hand force a consideration and comparison of multiple 
perspectives. The coherence of the process lies in the contextual 
balance between the general and the specific that it achieves for 
different informational resources and contexts. 
 
 235. The idea is commonly associated with the work of T.M. Scanlon. See THOMAS M. 
SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 153 (1998). 
 236. Singer, supra note 136, at 975. 
 237. Id. at 976–77. 
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In concrete terms, this suggests that intellectual property law 
would benefit from placing more reliance on practical, problem-solving 
techniques rather than theoretical consistency. For decades now, 
Congress and the federal courts have framed their discussion of the 
subject using uniform foundational values, even when logic and 
common sense point them elsewhereall in the name of coherence. 
Yet, the functioning of common law intellectual property ought to 
point to the reality that value pluralism and contestability are 
perfectly compatible with a well-functioning system of intellectual 
property rules. 
IV. OBJECTIONS 
The preceding parts of this Article have developed a model of 
judicial lawmaking from the working of common law intellectual 
property and have argued that it holds important lessons for the 
future of intellectual property reform efforts. This Part anticipates 
and responds to possible objections to the argument. Much like the 
theory of pragmatic incrementalism itself, the objections are both 
structural and substantive in nature: (1) that pragmatic 
incrementalism is inherently conservative; (2) that common law 
intellectual property operates at the margins of the intellectual 
property system; and (3) that my defense of it underplays the 
deficiencies of the common law.  
A. Pragmatic Incrementalism Is Inherently Conservative 
At first glance, the working of pragmatic incrementalism may 
seem diametrically opposed to change as an idea, and certainly 
antagonistic to radical change. Given its emphasis on small steps and 
incremental development over time, it certainly has overtones of 
Burkean conservatismin a methodological, rather than ideological 
sense.238 Yet, paradoxical as it may seem, pragmatic incrementalism is 
capable of being employed to bring about genuine change in the status 
quo. 
The idea of incremental change in the common law comes with 
the recognition that when circumstances demand, the extent of the 
change can indeed be significant.239 Even when significant, the change 
 
 238. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 74 (Frank M. Turner ed., 
Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1790); Sunstein, Minimalism, supra note 98, at 371. 
 239. As some have observed, Burke himself recognized the need for such change as society 
changes. BURKE, supra note 238, at 19, 51–52. For an interesting application of Burkean thought 
to patent law, see Thomas F. Cotter, A Burkean Perspective on Patent Eligibility, 22 BERKELEY 
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remains incremental in the sense that it develops from the 
accumulation of knowledge and information about the area over time. 
Decisions such as Palsgraf, MacPherson, and International News, all 
prominent examples of pragmatic incrementalism, did anything but 
affirm the status quo. Nonetheless, the extent of the change they 
introduced remained incremental in the use of ideas, concepts, and 
principles that were in existence and had been developed by the 
common law over an extended period of time. In other words, these 
decisions were radical, yet incremental. 
Additionally, incrementalism is hardly opposed to the idea of 
overruling precedent when necessary. Yet, overruling too can be 
incrementalwhen it recognizes that the idea underlying a previous 
case has come to be whittled away in spirit (even if not in express 
terms) by practice and holdings since.240 Like Burkean minimalism, 
pragmatic incrementalism cautions against decisionmaking in 
situations of extreme uncertainty, especially when completely unaided 
by information. Yet, as a theory about the judicial process, 
incrementalism is equally suspicious of such decisionmaking 
regardless of ideology, be it intellectual property minimalist or 
maximalist.  
Even if incrementalism is largely Burkean, its interface with 
pragmatism as a way of thinking about a problem in antifoundational 
terms actively facilitates change of a different kind. Accusations of 
conservatism and of biasing the status quo have long been leveled 
against pragmatism as a philosophical movement.241 Responding to 
portions of this criticism in a short essay, Richard Rorty succinctly 
observed that social change to pragmatism comes about by focusing on 
the real-world consequences of an idea, rather than by laying claim to 
 
TECH. L.J. 855, 858 (2007) (“[S]ome of the general themes found in Burke’s writing . . . may shed 
some light on some contemporary debates about the scope of patentable subject matter.”). 
 240. In a recent opinion of the Supreme Court, Justice Breyer dissented from the majority’s 
opinion which overruled a century-old precedent, noting that the process of overruling had to be 
incremental, and pointing to Cardozo’s approach as paradigmatic of this process. See Leegin 
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 928 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 241. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, “Just Do It”: Pragmatism and Progressive Social Change, 78 
VA. L. REV. 697, 697 (1992) (“[P]ragmatism is of scant use for achieving progressive social 
change.”); Allan C. Hutchinson, The Three ‘Rs’: Reading/Rorty/Radically, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
555, 583 (1989) (reviewing RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY (1989)) (“Law 
does the same for practical reason as philosophy does for reasoning at large; it attempts to turn 
it into a falsely privileged mode of discourse.”); Joseph W. Singer, Should Lawyers Care About 
Philosophy?, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1752, 1759 (reviewing RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND 
SOLIDARITY (1989)) (“By separating philosophy from justice, Rorty’s vision reinforces existing 
power relations that illegitimately oppress and exclude large segments of the population.”). 
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its truth or authority.242 Indeed, pragmatic incrementalism is in 
similar terms forward-looking, driven by its consequences for actors 
likely to be guided by the law’s normative (or guidance) power. As an 
antifoundational approach to rulemaking, it actively disavows reliance 
on a grand theoretical framework to reach a decision, but instead 
focuses attention on the pluralism of values and theories that operate 
under the normative structure of the law. In this respect too, it draws 
from pragmatism as a philosophy, which Rorty describes as 
principally “negative and renunciatory.”243  
In the intellectual property context, pragmatic 
incrementalism’s focus on epistemological pluralism is likely to bring 
about rather significant social change. With the ideas of ownership, 
economic incentives, and efficiency coming to dominate the way in 
which courts think about and apply the copyright and patent systems 
today, pragmatic incrementalism, as an antifoundational approach to 
rulemaking, is likely to force a recognition of the plurality of values 
and concerns at stake in the area. The amount of change enabled by 
any approach is entirely a factor of what the baseline for the change 
is. Given the foundationalism at work in different parts of intellectual 
property, pragmatic incrementalism can at the very least ensure a 
methodological shift in the way in which intellectual property rights 
are conceived and operationalized. Whether this comes about one case 
at a time, over a period of time, or through the gradual relinquishment 
of foundationalist rhetoric, it certainly constitutes change. 
B. The Marginality of Common Law Intellectual Property 
A second possible objection derives from the fact that the 
regimes described previously are all creatures of state law, likely to be 
preempted in different ways by federal intellectual property law. To 
some this might imply that these areas, though once robust, today 
operate in the interstices of the intellectual property system largely in 
recognition of their fragmented, common law development. In other 
words, their marginalization might be thought of as a consequence of 
their structural attributes, many of which the argument here extols. 
Additionally, to the extent that the three main federal intellectual 
property regimes could in theory preempt these state common law 
regimes, it might be seen as little more than a matter of time before 
 
 242. Richard Rorty, What Can You Expect from Anti-Foundationalist Philosophers?: A Reply 
to Lynn Baker, 78 VA. L. REV. 719, 719 (1992) (“They defend their proposals not solely in terms of 
how much we would like the consequences of the change they propose . . . but also by reference to 
the authority of that for which they speak.”). 
 243. Id. at 724. 
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Congress decides to replace or eliminate these laws altogether in 
recognition of these deficiencies. 
Federal preemption is no doubt an important issue in the 
intellectual property context; and indeed many of the regimes 
described have shrunk in significance as a consequence of it.244 Yet, 
the fact of the matter is that the common law intellectual property 
regimes that subsist today do so because they are thought to have a 
legitimate role in the intellectual property landscape. In other words, 
their structural and functional attributes are thought to be 
independently significant so as to warrant being preserved.  
Trade secret law is perhaps the best example of this. In the 
1974 case of Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. for instance, when 
presented with the question of whether state trade secret law ought to 
be preempted, the Court answered the question in the negative, 
sending a message to Congress that if it thought trade secret law 
worth preempting it ought to do so expressly.245 Observing that 
“Congress, by its silence over these many years, has seen the wisdom 
of allowing the States to enforce trade secret protection,”246 the Court 
went on to find that trade secret law performed an important function 
by deterring commercial impropriety. A few scholars and practicing 
lawyers no doubt continue to advance the claim that uniformity and 
consistency in interpretation demand the federalization of trade secret 
law, and as a result almost completely ignore the virtues of the 
 
 244. For work on the issue of federal preemption in intellectual property law, see Howard B. 
Abrams, Copyright, Misappropriation, and Preemption: Constitutional and Statutory Limits of 
State Law Protection, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 509, 580–81 (arguing section 301 of the Copyright Act 
has frustrated the intent of Congress to create a uniform federal system and the standards for 
copyright preemption must therefore be reformulated); Paul Heald, Federal Intellectual Property 
Law and the Economics of Preemption, 76 IOWA L. REV. 959, 1009 (1991) (arguing the propriety 
of preemption can be determined by analyzing the goals and balances struck by federal law 
reflected in the economics of patents, copyrights, and trademarks); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond 
Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 150 
(1999) (emphasizing the limits of preemption in resolving the conflict between freedom of 
contract and intellectual property policy); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the 
ProCD Case: A Market-Based Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53, 91 (1997) (arguing that 
Congress should clarify its intent regarding which copyright rules are immutable, but absent 
such clarification, courts should reference market considerations by analogy to other areas of the 
law to inform their decisions); Rothman, supra note 55, at 265 (contending that “[c]ourts must 
preempt the right of publicity when it is based solely on persona, is used to thwart a copyright 
holder's lawful exercise of rights to which the publicity holder consented, or when the Copyright 
Act explicitly permits the use at issue”); Sharon K. Sandeen, Kewanee Revisited: Returning to 
First Principles of Intellectual Property Law to Determine the Issue of Federal Preemption, 12 
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 299, 357 (2008) (arguing it is the fact that state law “does not 
unduly restrict free competition in information” that saves it from federal preemption). 
 245. 416 U.S. 470, 492–93 (1974). 
 246. Id. at 493. 
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common law process.247 Not surprisingly, these proposals have seen 
little success in practice.248  
The same holds true of other forms of common law intellectual 
property. In enacting the preemption provisions of the 1976 Copyright 
Act, Congress expressly observed that publicity rights and trade 
secrets were “evolving” doctrines and outside the purview of copyright 
preemption as long as they continued to differentiate themselves from 
traditional copyright lawan indirect reference to their 
adaptability.249 Additionally, in relation to the misappropriation 
doctrine, Congress observed that state law should continue to have the 
“flexibility” needed to afford a remedy to plaintiffs when needed, 
referring specifically to the “traditional principles of equity.”250 These 
references clearly illustrate that, while subject matter certainly was 
important in Congress’s exclusion of these regimes from the reach of 
federal preemption, their structural attributes were equally important 
and recognized as independently beneficial. The congressional 
“silence” that the Court spoke of in Kewanee was thus followed by an 
unequivocal endorsement of the continuing utility of these regimes in 
structural and functional terms.251 
The marginality of common law intellectual property is thus 
hardly a consequence of its structural features. The argument here 
accepts the reality that common law intellectual property regimes 
tend to get insufficient attention in discussions of the subject. While 
the federalization of intellectual property and the decline of federal 
general common law as a stand-alone body may have contributed to 
this, the argument’s principal objective has been to show that this 
marginalization has ignored the lawmaking processes that these 
 
 247. See, e.g., David S. Almeling, Four Reasons to Enact a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 19 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 769, 770–71 (2009); Marina Lao, Federalizing Trade 
Secrets Law in an Information Economy, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1633, 1633 (1998); Christopher Rebel 
J. Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 427, 442–43 (1995); 
Carole P. Sadler, Federal Copyright Protection and State Trade Secret Protection: The Case for 
Partial Preemption, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 667, 669, 671–74 (1984). 
 248. Besides congressional inaction in the area, it is also interesting to note that in its most 
recent report on the subject, the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) 
recommended against the federalization of trade secret law, after reviewing multiple proposals to 
the contrary. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE TRADE SECRETS COMMITTEE 2 
(2007), available at http://www.aipla.org/MSTemplate.cfm?Section=Proposal_to_Federalize_ 
Trade_Secret_Law&Site=Trade_Secret_Law&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.c
fm&ContentID=7041. One of the principal reasons that the report cites for its conclusion is the 
need to allow states to develop their local economies by adapting the law to the needs of their 
individual marketplaces. Id. at 7. This most certainly is an allusion to the inherent adaptability 
of trade secret law, and the benefits of a ‘no one size for all’ approach to the subject.  
 249. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748.  
 250. Id. 
 251. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 493. 
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regimes employ. Congress clearly sees some virtue in these lawmaking 
processes, as evidenced by its actions in carving out a distinct space 
for them. Recognizing and accepting the marginality of what these 
regimes cover (that is, their subject matter) does not translate into a 
denunciation of their lawmaking processes.  
Perhaps most importantly though, the normative goal of this 
Article has been to show that the common law method of rulemaking 
that these regimes use is suitable for a host of other intellectual 
property contextswhether federal or state, entirely common law 
based, or interwoven with statutory provisions. The claim uses 
common law intellectual property to illustrate the functioning of this 
method; yet, the method itself is hardly tied to these regimes. It is 
possible to reconstruct the existing common law parts of the federal 
intellectual property regimes such as the fair use doctrine in positive 
terms along nearly identical lines.252 
C. Courts and Their Deficiencies 
A last possible objection is also perhaps the strongest, since it 
looks to the practical side of pragmatic incrementalism. This is that 
the defense of pragmatic incrementalism in common law intellectual 
property pays insufficient attention to the problems associated with 
looking to courts for rule generation. These shortcomings are said to 
derive from: (1) questions of judicial competence, whether judges are 
capable of making the policy decisions that intellectual property law 
demands; and (2) the problem of dividing responsibility between judge 
and jury in the adjudicatory process, an enduring problem of the 
adjudicatory process. The analysis below examines each issue and its 
significance for intellectual property as it relates to some of my 
previous claims about pragmatic incrementalism.  
 
 252. The fair use doctrine was originally the creation of courts. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. 
Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (holding that in determining whether a use is 
permitted, the court must consider “the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity 
and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or 
diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work”). Yet, in drafting the current 
version of the doctrine, contained in 17 U.S.C. § 107, Congress again clearly recognized that “the 
endless variety of situations and combinations of circumstances that can rise in particular cases 
precludes the formulation of exact rules” and that “courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to 
particular situations on a case-by-case basis.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66, reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5680. Indeed, the method that courts have used to develop the doctrine is worthy 
of independent analysis along the lines carried out here. 
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1. Competence 
The argument from competence has two parts to it. The first is 
the claim that since common law intellectual property tends to be 
state law, state courts may not be as well equipped and competent as 
their federal counterparts, given that a large number of states appoint 
judges through elections or other political processes.253 This objection 
is of limited significance for my claim here, since as noted before, 
nothing in my defense of pragmatic incrementalism ties it to state 
courts.254 Indeed the broader normative goal of the project is to have 
federal law (and courts) internalize some of the methods that state 
courts developed and routinely apply. We may therefore move on to 
the second part, which is the more generic claim that courts, whether 
federal or state, are less competent than legislatures or indeed 
administrative agencies in dealing with matters of a specialized 
nature, of which intellectual property law is clearly a subset.  
The claim that specialization and complexity necessitate less 
judicial involvement is hardly true of a host of other areas. Tort law, 
antitrust law, and several other areas exhibit similar levels of 
complexity, and yet have for ages been handled and developed 
principally by courts. This is no less true of intellectual property law 
in general, where generalist courts have always arbitrated disputes 
and on occasions moved the law along incrementally. Additionally, the 
intellectual property system’s one experiment with a specialized court 
for patent law has hardly been a runaway success, with many 
questioning the wisdom behind allowing a specialized court to develop 
its jurisprudence independent of the general corpus of law and legal 
reasoning that applies to other areas.255 When complexity is indeed an 
issue, and requires the input of experts from different disciplines, the 
answer may lie in fostering a greater role for administrative agencies 
in the lawmaking process, to collaborate with and inform judicial rule 
development. The role of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) in 
 
 253. For an elaborate overview of the different appointment processes followed in different 
state courts, see Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 
1077, 1079–86 (2007).  
 254. See supra p. 1551. 
 255. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized 
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 25 (1989) (discussing the concern that specialization would lead to 
inferior law because “channeling cases to a single forum” would decrease the “percolation of ideas 
within the judiciary”); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An 
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1108–10 (2004) (arguing 
the Federal Circuit has not yet achieved its mandate of a clearer, more coherent, more 
predictable legal infrastructure for the resolution of patent cases, but is on the trajectory to 
achieve it in the future). 
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developing antitrust law might in this context represent a model to 
follow.256 Antitrust law, much like common law intellectual property, 
is principally the creation of courts through the common law process. 
Yet, the FTC issues guidelines, studies, and instructions on different 
areas and industries, to which courts routinely look (and often defer) 
in their analysis and development of the law.257 The answer may thus 
lie in more agency involvement rather than attempting to take the 
primary task of lawmaking away from courts and handing it back to 
legislatures. 
As this argument has emphasized throughout, adopting 
pragmatic incrementalism as an approach to lawmaking does not 
necessarily entail abjuring all reliance on legislation. Indeed the 
common law regimes discussed previously have come to reflect that 
reality, with many of them now being codified in different forms. The 
answer thus lies in a collaborative lawmaking exercise, with 
legislatures or agencies providing concrete, specialized rules when 
needed, and courts having a greater say in developing parts of the law 
that are best suited to incremental antifoundational development. 
Indeed, as some have argued, a similar collaborative model existed 
early in the development of copyright law, before the system turned 
entirely to statutory reform for solutions.258 
2. Judge/Jury 
A second problem that might be identified in the account of 
pragmatic incrementalism is that it elides the division of 
responsibility between judge and jury in the decisionmaking process. 
In various other common law contexts, most notably tort law, the 
judge-jury divide continues to be an issue that plays a rather 
significant role in influencing the shape and direction of the law. In 
order to vest decisionmaking either with the jury or to take it away 
from them, questions of law and fact tend to be framed in terms that 
complicate the doctrinal framework.259 The issue of causation in 
 
 256. See generally ROBERT A. KATZMANN, REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY: THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION AND ANTITRUST POLICY (1980) (providing an overview of the FTC’s transformation 
and its effects on antitrust policy). 
 257. For a recent overview of this interaction by the FTC Commissioner, see J. Thomas 
Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the Berlin Forum on EU-US Legal-Economic 
Affairs: Thoughts on the FTC’s Relationship (Constitutional and Otherwise) to the Legislative, 
Executive, and Judicial Branches, (Sept. 19, 2009), http:// www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/090919 
roschberlinspeech.pdf. 
 258. Pierre N. Leval, An Assembly of Idiots?, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1049, 1061–62 (2002). 
 259. See James Fleming, Jr., Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 
667, 679–85 (1949) (describing the ways by which this division is achieved in accident law, and 
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negligence law is a good example of this phenomenon, where the 
bifurcation of proximate cause and cause-in-fact often complicates the 
inquiry.260 The same is likely to happen with intellectual property 
cases as well, should lawmaking come to increasingly rely on courts. 
The proper role of juries in intellectual property cases has thus 
far received little systematic attention, even under existent law.261 In 
patent cases for instance, the Federal Circuit itself has advocated a 
case-by-case approach to determining which issues are purely factual 
and therefore legitimately delegated to juries.262 Yet, one recent study 
reveals that litigants and lawyers tend to adhere to the popular view 
that juries are incompetent when it comes to dealing with complex 
legal issues.263  
The ideal division of responsibility between judge and jury will 
no doubt remain an issue with an increased role for courts in 
intellectual property. As such however, it is unlikely to interfere with 
their reliance on the method of pragmatic incrementalism developed 
here. This is so for two interconnected reasons. First, as a method of 
lawmaking, pragmatic incrementalism emphasizes techniques and 
approaches that are entirely within the exclusive domain of a judge’s 
role in providing a reasoned decision. Building on legal pragmatism, 
its central premise remains the importance of forward-looking 
adjudication that pays close attention to future consequences and the 
guidance function of the law. Juries, by contrast, tend to focus on 
elements in a particular case, thus engaging in a largely backward-
looking exercise. Second, appellate courts almost always carry out this 
method of incremental rule development in an effort to provide lower 
courts with guidance for the future. In other words, pragmatic 
 
the problems that accompany it); Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula 
Balancing, the Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REV. 813, 854–56 (2001) 
(examining the appropriate role of juries in negligence cases). 
 260. Leon Green, Jury Trial and Proximate Cause, 35 TEX. L. REV. 357, 358–59 (1957). 
 261. For notable exceptions in the patent context, see Gary M. Hnath & Timothy A. Molino, 
The Roles of Judges and Juries in Patent Litigation, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 15, 17 (2009) (analyzing 
the role of juries in patent cases); Jennifer F. Miller, iBrief, Should Juries Hear Complex Patent 
Cases?, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0004, at ¶ 1 (discussing the constitutionality of a “complexity 
exception” to the right to a jury trial in patent cases, under which there would be no such right 
where the complexity of the facts or legal issues of the case is so great that it is impossible for the 
jury to render a fair and reasonable verdict); Kimberly A. Moore, Juries, Patent Cases, & a Lack 
of Transparency, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 779, 801 (2002) (examining the inadequacies of juries in 
patent cases); Kimberley A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside 
the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 368 (2000) [hereinafter Moore, Black Box] (studying the 
patent-holder win rates in cases tried before judges and juries and finding that the data results 
from her study suggest problems in the jury adjudication of patent suits). 
 262. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 263. Moore, Black Box, supra note 261, at 369–74. 
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incrementalism, as a method of lawmaking rather than simple 
adjudication, emphasizes courts working with existent precedent and 
interpretatively molding the law to new situations, in the process 
developing it incrementally. This remains an exercise almost always 
undertaken by intermediate and final courts of appeal, in both the 
federal and state systems, where the judge-jury divide becomes 
irrelevant. 
V. A STYLIZED EXAMPLE: THE FASHION INDUSTRY 
To illustrate the lessons of common law intellectual property, 
this Part looks at how a common law approach might be applied to a 
setting where scholars and policymakers today disagree strongly 
about the need for, and consequences of, intellectual property 
protection: the fashion industry. 
For decades now, the fashion industry in the United States has 
been without intellectual property protection for original designs. 
Because federal copyright law prohibits protection for utilitarian 
articles, courts have denied protection to fashion designs by default.264 
Despite this reality, the U.S. fashion industry remains vibrant.265 The 
last few years have seen a renewed interest in understanding the 
reasons for this phenomenon and the lessons that can be drawn from 
it for intellectual property law more generally. 
In an influential article, Kal Raustiala and Christopher 
Sprigman argue that an examination of the fashion industry’s 
structure reveals that the absence of intellectual property protection 
has contributed to greater innovation and creativity in designs.266 
Knowing that their designs are likely to be copied and disseminated at 
different price ranges induces designers to generate new designs with 
greater rapidity than they would have had to without such copying. 
They propose a theory of “induced obsolescence” to explain design 
houses’ incentives to create.267 The diffusion of a design to a broader 
class of consumers diminishes its exclusivity, but in turn generates 
 
 264. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2008) (defining a “useful article” as “an article having an intrinsic 
utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey 
information”); see also 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 58, § 2.18 (describing copyright law’s 
reluctance to accord utilitarian articles protection). 
 265. For an early identification of this phenomenon in the legal literature, see Jonathan M. 
Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal Street: Reflections on Status Consumption, Intellectual 
Property, and the Incentive Thesis, 91 VA. L. REV. 1381, 1384 (2005). 
 266. Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 178, at 1775–77. 
 267. Id. at 1722. 
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the need to maintain that exclusivity by introducing new designs upon 
such diffusion. Raustiala and Sprigman thus observe:  
As a design is copied by others and used in less-expensive derivative works, it becomes 
more widely purchased. Past a certain inflection point, the diffusion of the design erodes 
its positional value, and the fashion item becomes anathema to the fashion-conscious. 
This drives status-seekers to new designs in an effort to distinguish their apparel 
choices from those of the masses.268  
Thus, the differentiated nature of the market for fashion designs and 
the diffusion it effectuates by lowering the price of copies is central to 
their explanation.269 
Contrast this with the story that Scott Hemphill and Jeannie 
Suk tell about the same phenomenon.270 Advocating a cultural 
approach to law and economics,271 they argue that the absence of 
intellectual property protection cannot but diminish the incentive of 
fashion houses to innovate and create new designs, and that a world 
with such protection would see even more innovation.272 They thus 
observe that “fashion is relevantly similar to other areas of creative 
production, and we expect designers to respond to economic incentives 
in the usual way.”273 Relying on the effects of copying on innovation in 
other areas of creative production, reports on the effectiveness of the 
Fashion Originators Guild in curbing piracy in the industry, and the 
reality that the industry remains divided on the question of 
intellectual property protection, they advocate the creation of tailored 
copyright protection for fashion designs.274 Hemphill and Suk’s idea of 
“tailoring,” though, involves varying the standard of substantial 
similarity, so as to allow protection only for identical copies and not 
those that have “substantial difference[s].”275 
Both sides, however, pay insufficient attention to the 
importance of the segmented nature of the market for fashion. While 
Raustiala and Sprigman observe how copying occurs in all segments of 
the industry,276 their theory of diffusion seems contingent on the 
importance of copying by actors in a lower segment of the industry. 
Hemphill and Suk on the other hand presume that the mere ability to 
 
 268. Id. at 1721. 
 269. See id. at 1693–94 (describing the existence of a “fashion pyramid”). 
 270. C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 1147 (2009). 
 271. Id. at 1154. 
 272. Id. at 1153, 1180. 
 273. Id. at 1193. 
 274. Id. at 1174–80, 1193–4, 1151. 
 275. Id. at 1188. 
 276. See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 178, at 1705 (stating that copying in the fashion 
design industry is “ubiquitous”). 
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prevent the copying of a design, regardless of who is performing the 
copying, is likely to provide an incentive to create.277 
If both sides are to be believedthat diffusion does indeed spur 
rapid innovation, and that market exclusivity contributes to the 
incentive to create and innovatereform proposals ought to pay closer 
attention to the idea of “direct competition.” A regime that prevents 
copying only in the context of direct competition in the same segment 
of the market would at once both allow the incentives argument to 
have some play, and at the same time enable the process of diffusion 
to continue, spreading fashion more widely and making it accessible to 
a broader class of consumers. Surprisingly, neither set of authors 
mentions the common law doctrine of misappropriation as a way 
forward, when one of the earliest attempts to provide the fashion 
industry with some protection involved an attempt to extend the 
doctrine. In Cheney Brothers v. Doris Silk Corp.,278 the Second Circuit 
considered the argument that the common law doctrine of 
misappropriation allowed a fashion designer to preclude the copying of 
a design by a competitor, for such time as the design held value, the 
limited duration of a fashion cycle.279 Even so, Judge Learned Hand 
was particularly dismissive of common law misappropriation in his 
opinion, describing it as an act of “solecism,” and dismissing the 
plaintiff’s claims because of his disdain for the doctrine.280 While state 
courts have since resurrected the doctrine, hardly anyone has since 
analyzed its suitability for the fashion industry. The common law 
doctrine of misappropriation, developed using the methods of 
pragmatic incrementalism, might indeed provide the fashion industry 
with a tailored, low social cost mechanism of protection. 
The misappropriation doctrine is likely to protect a fashion 
design only as long as the design is time-sensitive, which is usually the 
duration of a fashion cycle, as reflected in the plaintiff’s claim in 
 
 277. Hemphill & Suk, supra note 270, at 1180. What is additionally surprising is that 
Hemphill and Suk fail to note that this was the finding of one of the earliest attempts to 
understand the role of economic incentives in the fashion industry. See Barnett, supra note 265, 
at 1382 (“[T]he incentive thesis still rests on another vulnerable factual assumption: namely, 
that third-party imitators necessarily take away sales that would have been captured by the 
innovator, therefore reducing the innovator’s expected return ex post and its investment 
incentives ex ante.”). 
 278. 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929). 
 279. Id. at 279–80. 
 280. Id. at 280. For more recent criticism of the misappropriation doctrine, alluding to 
institutional design concerns inherent in it, see Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation: A Dirge, 40 
HOUS. L. REV. 621, 632–41 (2003). 
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Cheney Brothers and in the literature on the industry.281 Additionally, 
any protection is likely to be only against copying by a direct 
competitor. But who exactly is a direct competitor? The stratified 
nature of the fashion industry is unlikely to make this hard to 
determine. Forever 21 or H&M aren’t competing in the same segment 
of the market as Chanel and Gucci, but would nonetheless be 
considered competitors inter se. Courts undertake precisely this 
analysis in the antitrust context when asked to determine the 
“relevant market” for a product or service. The determination 
commonly involves the use of cross-elasticity of demand or similar 
variables for the analysis.282  
Using common law misappropriation for fashion designs would 
also exhibit several strains of pragmatic incrementalism:  
Caution: The use of misappropriation would enable courts to 
develop protection tentatively. By avoiding the in rem nature of 
property, and tailoring the entitlement to operate only against a 
narrowly defined class of defendants, the regime would have little 
effect on the public. Additionally, should it prove to impede creativity 
over time, courts would be able to tailor it further, or have a basis by 
which to roll back the regime.  
Value Pluralism: The use of misappropriation instead of a full-
blown property regime would also amount to recognition of the 
multiplicity of interests at work in the regime, beyond just the 
incentives of fashion designers. The social utility of copying, 
distributive values, reputational elements, and other fairness concerns 
would have a legitimate place in the regime. For instance, in relation 
to the misappropriation doctrine, courts have occasionally relaxed the 
element of direct competition when the subject matter involved is so 
intricately tied to a plaintiff that its use by a defendant isn’t 
anticompetitive merely because of its incentive effects, but also 
because it appropriates the reputation and identity of the creator.283  
Tailoring Through Custom: A misappropriation-based regime 
is also likely to allow for a good degree of contextual tailoring. The 
 
 281. See, e.g., PAUL H. NYSTROM, ECONOMICS OF FASHION 18–36 (1928) (describing the wave-
like movement of a normal fashion cycle in which the fashion rises, peaks, and then declines in 
popular acceptance and factors which influence this cycle); Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Design 
Innovation and Fashion Cycles, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 771, 785–87 (1995) (discussing the cyclical 
nature of fashion and factors influencing it). 
 282. See PHILIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 
572–73 (4th ed. 1988) (discussing the definition of a relevant market for purposes of antitrust 
law). 
 283. See U.S. Golf Ass’n v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-Max, Inc., 749 F.2d 1028, 1039 (3d Cir. 
1984) (attempting to explain cases that have dispensed with this requirement along similar 
lines). 
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regime as a whole would be modeled on an equilibrium of inter-
segment copying currently prevalent in the fashion industry.284 
Additionally, elements internal to the regime could be adapted to the 
unique needs of the industry, as they change over time. Thus, the idea 
of “time-sensitivity,” contingent on the duration of a fashion season 
may come to be modified, should the fashion industry decide to adopt 
additional fashion cycles, or conversely go from multiple cycles to a 
single one for a calendar year. Further, the regime could also come to 
incorporate exceptions for copying, when the copying itself conforms to 
what Hemphill and Suk describe as following a “trend.”285 Customary 
practices such as trends are likely to inform courts’ understanding of 
copying, in working the regime, and will indeed at times caution 
against affording a plaintiff any kind of protection.  
Ex Ante/Ex Post Integration: If modeled on the “hot news” 
doctrine that courts currently use for misappropriation, the regime 
would also require courts to balance and integrate the ex ante and the 
ex post. Instead of simply assuming that every instance of copying is 
likely to interfere with the incentive to create, it would have courts 
examine the circumstances under which the copying was done, and 
also the commercial significance of a plaintiff’s motives for creation. 
Courts would thus have the option of denying a plaintiff protection if 
they were to conclude that allowing the copying is unlikely to have 
any impact on the original incentive to create.  
In all the debates about intellectual property for fashion 
designs, no one seems to have thought of looking to the common law 
for any guidance. All the proposals to date have relied extensively on 
statutory formulations of a copyright-like in rem entitlement, with 
predetermined carve-outs.286 “Tailoring,” though, ought to mean more 
than just industry-specific legislation that leaves little room for courts 
to maneuver as socioeconomic circumstances change. Regardless of 
whether the law originates at the federal or state level, discussions 
would do well to look to the common law doctrine of misappropriation, 
and its use of a flexible, contextual approach to protection, as a viable 
option. 
 
 284. See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 178, at 1718 (describing the allowance for 
appropriation in the fashion industry as a “stable equilibrium”). 
 285. Hemphill & Suk, supra note 270, at 1159–61. 
 286. See, e.g., Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 2033, 110th Cong. § 2(d) (2007); Design 
Piracy Prohibition Act, S. 1957, 110th Cong. § 2(d) (2007). 
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CONCLUSION 
In describing the virtues of the common law’s method of 
incremental rule development, Richard Epstein once noted that it “has 
hidden resources that are all too easily overlooked by scholars who 
start with some grand claim” for the institution.287 Nowhere is this 
phenomenon more apparent than in the world of intellectual property 
law, long thought to be entirely about federal statutory regimes that 
center around one or more core values. In their focus on these regimes, 
discussions of the subject have altogether ignored the utility and 
significance of common law intellectual propertyand, as I have 
argued, without sufficient justification.  
Pragmatic incrementalism, the method of lawmaking that 
common law intellectual property regimes employ, influences both the 
structure and content of the law. As a form of common law rule 
development, it generates rules and principles from within the reality 
of a bilateral dispute presented to a court. Additionally, it emphasizes 
the virtues of beginning the process without looking to an abstract 
theory to justify the outcome, of focusing on the context for a rule, of 
understanding the short- and long-term consequences of a rule, and of 
proceeding with caution, one case at a time. These virtues can indeed 
be identified with several techniques that courts routinely adopt when 
applying and developing common law intellectual property rules. The 
continued vitality and robustness of these regimes under state law is 
in many ways a result of courts’ use of these techniques to address 
many of the substantive and structural issues that continue to haunt 
traditional intellectual property.  
The working of pragmatic incrementalism in common law 
intellectual property also serves to highlight the reality that some 
areas of law—such as intellectual property—may stand to benefit 
more from attempts to develop theories of lawmaking rather than just 
law. Focusing on the lawmaking process is more than just a 
procedural concern, for, as we have seen, the common law’s structure 
of lawmaking greatly influences the substantive content of the law 
that courts develop and apply. Discussions and debate in intellectual 
property law would perhaps gain considerably from greater attention 
to the institutional process by which its entitlements are created and 
enforced in practice. 
For centuries now, courts, policymakers, and scholars from a 
multitude of disciplines have struggled, without success, to articulate 
a coherent theoretical justification for intellectual property—one that 
 
 287. Epstein, supra note 29, at 73. 
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does justice to the myriad interests and values that are central to it. 
This reality has long been taken to represent a fundamental failing of 
the subject. Yet, as I have argued, this theoretical incoherence ought 
to be seen instead as a starting point for a common law analysis of the 
subject, one that focuses on what parties affected by the law seek in 
practice, and the multi-faceted ways in which courts balance, limit, 
and help realize these needs on a nuanced basis over time, allowing 
the area of law as a whole to “work itself pure.”288 
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